Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The brave new economy being rebuilt in the wake of the financial meltdown is being built on low-wage service work, as manufacturing’s decline has accelerated and construction ground to a halt. At the beginning of the Great Recession, economist Heather Boushey noted at Slate, manufacturing and construction made up fully half the jobs lost, along with financial services and other business fields, and writers declared the “Mancession” or “He-cession” or even, as Hanna Rosin’s popular book has it, The End of Men. But as others have pointed out, as the recession drags on, it’s women who’ve faced the largest losses, not only in direct attacks on public sector jobs that are dominated by women, but in increased competition from the men pushed out of their previous professions. Some 60 percent of the jobs lost in the public sector were held by women, according to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research. And women have regained only 12 percent of the jobs lost during the recession, while men have regained 63 percent of the jobs they lost.

Women may be overrepresented in the growing sectors of the economy, but those sectors pay poverty wages. The public sector job cuts that have been largely responsible for unemployment remaining at or near 8 percent have fallen disproportionately on women (and women of color are hit the hardest). Those good union jobs disappear, and are replaced with a minimum-wage gig at Walmart—and even in retail, women make only 90 percent of what men make.

“All work is gendered. And the economy that we have assigns different levels of value based off of that,” says Ai-Jen Poo, executive director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance. Poo came to labor organizing through feminism. As a volunteer in a domestic violence shelter for Asian immigrant women, she explains, she realized that it was women who had economic opportunities who were able to break the cycle of violence. She brings a sharp gender analysis to the struggle for respect and better treatment for the workers, mostly women, who “make all other work possible.”

“Society has devalued that work over time,” she notes of the cleaning, caring, cooking, and other work domestic workers perform, largely hidden from public view, “and we think that that has a lot to do with who’s done the work.”

This argument was at the root of the fight for access to employment outside of the “pink-collar” fields. To be trapped in women’s jobs was to be forever trapped in a certain vision of femininity. Breaking out of “women’s work” was a form of breaking through the “feminine mystique” that Betty Friedan decried. But that work still needs to be done, and, Poo notes, the conditions that have long defined domestic work and service work—instability, lack of training, lack of career pathways, low pay—are now increasingly the reality for all American workers, not just women. When we focus on equal access at the top, we miss out the real story, which historian Bethany Moreton points out, “is not ‘Oh wow, women get to be lawyers,’ but that men get to be casualized clerks.”

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The brave new economy being rebuilt in the wake of the financial meltdown is being built on low-wage service work, as manufacturing’s decline has accelerated and construction ground to a halt. At the beginning of the Great Recession, economist Heather Boushey noted at Slate, manufacturing and construction made up fully half the jobs lost, along with financial services and other business fields, and writers declared the “Mancession” or “He-cession” or even, as Hanna Rosin’s popular book has it, The End of Men. But as others have pointed out, as the recession drags on, it’s women who’ve faced the largest losses, not only in direct attacks on public sector jobs that are dominated by women, but in increased competition from the men pushed out of their previous professions. Some 60 percent of the jobs lost in the public sector were held by women, according to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research. And women have regained only 12 percent of the jobs lost during the recession, while men have regained 63 percent of the jobs they lost.

Women may be overrepresented in the growing sectors of the economy, but those sectors pay poverty wages. The public sector job cuts that have been largely responsible for unemployment remaining at or near 8 percent have fallen disproportionately on women (and women of color are hit the hardest). Those good union jobs disappear, and are replaced with a minimum-wage gig at Walmart—and even in retail, women make only 90 percent of what men make.

“All work is gendered. And the economy that we have assigns different levels of value based off of that,” says Ai-Jen Poo, executive director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance. Poo came to labor organizing through feminism. As a volunteer in a domestic violence shelter for Asian immigrant women, she explains, she realized that it was women who had economic opportunities who were able to break the cycle of violence. She brings a sharp gender analysis to the struggle for respect and better treatment for the workers, mostly women, who “make all other work possible.”

“Society has devalued that work over time,” she notes of the cleaning, caring, cooking, and other work domestic workers perform, largely hidden from public view, “and we think that that has a lot to do with who’s done the work.”

This argument was at the root of the fight for access to employment outside of the “pink-collar” fields. To be trapped in women’s jobs was to be forever trapped in a certain vision of femininity. Breaking out of “women’s work” was a form of breaking through the “feminine mystique” that Betty Friedan decried. But that work still needs to be done, and, Poo notes, the conditions that have long defined domestic work and service work—instability, lack of training, lack of career pathways, low pay—are now increasingly the reality for all American workers, not just women. When we focus on equal access at the top, we miss out the real story, which historian Bethany Moreton points out, “is not ‘Oh wow, women get to be lawyers,’ but that men get to be casualized clerks.”

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The brave new economy being rebuilt in the wake of the financial meltdown is being built on low-wage service work, as manufacturing’s decline has accelerated and construction ground to a halt. At the beginning of the Great Recession, economist Heather Boushey noted at Slate, manufacturing and construction made up fully half the jobs lost, along with financial services and other business fields, and writers declared the “Mancession” or “He-cession” or even, as Hanna Rosin’s popular book has it, The End of Men. But as others have pointed out, as the recession drags on, it’s women who’ve faced the largest losses, not only in direct attacks on public sector jobs that are dominated by women, but in increased competition from the men pushed out of their previous professions. Some 60 percent of the jobs lost in the public sector were held by women, according to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research. And women have regained only 12 percent of the jobs lost during the recession, while men have regained 63 percent of the jobs they lost.

Women may be overrepresented in the growing sectors of the economy, but those sectors pay poverty wages. The public sector job cuts that have been largely responsible for unemployment remaining at or near 8 percent have fallen disproportionately on women (and women of color are hit the hardest). Those good union jobs disappear, and are replaced with a minimum-wage gig at Walmart—and even in retail, women make only 90 percent of what men make.

“All work is gendered. And the economy that we have assigns different levels of value based off of that,” says Ai-Jen Poo, executive director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance. Poo came to labor organizing through feminism. As a volunteer in a domestic violence shelter for Asian immigrant women, she explains, she realized that it was women who had economic opportunities who were able to break the cycle of violence. She brings a sharp gender analysis to the struggle for respect and better treatment for the workers, mostly women, who “make all other work possible.”

“Society has devalued that work over time,” she notes of the cleaning, caring, cooking, and other work domestic workers perform, largely hidden from public view, “and we think that that has a lot to do with who’s done the work.”

This argument was at the root of the fight for access to employment outside of the “pink-collar” fields. To be trapped in women’s jobs was to be forever trapped in a certain vision of femininity. Breaking out of “women’s work” was a form of breaking through the “feminine mystique” that Betty Friedan decried. But that work still needs to be done, and, Poo notes, the conditions that have long defined domestic work and service work—instability, lack of training, lack of career pathways, low pay—are now increasingly the reality for all American workers, not just women. When we focus on equal access at the top, we miss out the real story, which historian Bethany Moreton points out, “is not ‘Oh wow, women get to be lawyers,’ but that men get to be casualized clerks.”

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The brave new economy being rebuilt in the wake of the financial meltdown is being built on low-wage service work, as manufacturing’s decline has accelerated and construction ground to a halt. At the beginning of the Great Recession, economist Heather Boushey noted at Slate, manufacturing and construction made up fully half the jobs lost, along with financial services and other business fields, and writers declared the “Mancession” or “He-cession” or even, as Hanna Rosin’s popular book has it, The End of Men. But as others have pointed out, as the recession drags on, it’s women who’ve faced the largest losses, not only in direct attacks on public sector jobs that are dominated by women, but in increased competition from the men pushed out of their previous professions. Some 60 percent of the jobs lost in the public sector were held by women, according to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research. And women have regained only 12 percent of the jobs lost during the recession, while men have regained 63 percent of the jobs they lost.

Women may be overrepresented in the growing sectors of the economy, but those sectors pay poverty wages. The public sector job cuts that have been largely responsible for unemployment remaining at or near 8 percent have fallen disproportionately on women (and women of color are hit the hardest). Those good union jobs disappear, and are replaced with a minimum-wage gig at Walmart—and even in retail, women make only 90 percent of what men make.

“All work is gendered. And the economy that we have assigns different levels of value based off of that,” says Ai-Jen Poo, executive director of the National Domestic Workers Alliance. Poo came to labor organizing through feminism. As a volunteer in a domestic violence shelter for Asian immigrant women, she explains, she realized that it was women who had economic opportunities who were able to break the cycle of violence. She brings a sharp gender analysis to the struggle for respect and better treatment for the workers, mostly women, who “make all other work possible.”

“Society has devalued that work over time,” she notes of the cleaning, caring, cooking, and other work domestic workers perform, largely hidden from public view, “and we think that that has a lot to do with who’s done the work.”

This argument was at the root of the fight for access to employment outside of the “pink-collar” fields. To be trapped in women’s jobs was to be forever trapped in a certain vision of femininity. Breaking out of “women’s work” was a form of breaking through the “feminine mystique” that Betty Friedan decried. But that work still needs to be done, and, Poo notes, the conditions that have long defined domestic work and service work—instability, lack of training, lack of career pathways, low pay—are now increasingly the reality for all American workers, not just women. When we focus on equal access at the top, we miss out the real story, which historian Bethany Moreton points out, “is not ‘Oh wow, women get to be lawyers,’ but that men get to be casualized clerks.”

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

In the early darkness of a midsummer Monday in 1945, some of the world’s most brilliant scientists and engineers prepared to detonate the first nuclear explosive device. They called it “the Gadget.” At 5:29 a.m., a flash erupted so intensely bright that it briefly blinded even through the lenses. One of the scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, thought of the Hindu scriptures that had inspired him since youth: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one.” Oppenheimer felt the weight of the purpose to which this awesome power — roughly equivalent to 44 million pounds of TNT, plus lethal radioactivity — would be put, and another line from the Bhagavad-Gita sprang to mind. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Three weeks later, on Aug. 6, a device on the same now-proven principles fell...over Hiroshima, Japan. Three days after that, on Aug. 9, a third bomb, essentially identical to the Gadget, was dropped on the port city of Nagasaki.

Journalists announce and discard eras as casually as bingo numbers, but a true historical dividing line was blasted into the sands of New Mexico. Before the blinding flash, only gods destroyed worlds. Then the power passed into human hands. That dividing line is so stark that it obscures the long path that led to our nuclear fate. The Bomb is often presented as a discrete choice, an option unmoored from history, unrelated to the countless choices and decisions, accidents and discoveries, that produced it. A simple yes or no: However, the Bomb is better understood as the terrible yet logical — and probably inevitable — result of a chain of developments in science, technology and the nature of war going back centuries. These developments moved in one direction only, toward ever more fearsome weapons and ever more catastrophic wars. This momentum made the nuclear age unavoidable.

Henry Stimson, the elderly secretary of war, alluded to this inevitability in April 1945. His memo to Truman brought the new president into the tight circle of secrecy around the development of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history,” as Stimson put it. The Allies were given no choice but to outrace the Germans and Japanese and Soviets to this weapon, for its scientific basis was known to physicists worldwide from the earliest days of the war. Unfortunately, the world’s “moral advancement” had not accelerated to keep pace with its technical proficiency, Stimson added ruefully, thus: “modern civilization might be completely destroyed.”

In the 75 years since,  the famous Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has never permitted much reason for hope...yet, the worst-case scenario remains in abeyance. What’s more, while the Bomb has not ended all wars, its menacing umbrella has spared the world from another industrial-scale conflagration among great powers. This is no small thing. During the last 31 years before the nuclear age, warfare consumed more than 100 million lives, the majority of them civilians. The only thing worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the unspeakable brutality that preceded them.

In the New Mexico desert, perhaps — perhaps — the world finally found a weapon awful enough to end the escalation.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

In the early darkness of a midsummer Monday in 1945, some of the world’s most brilliant scientists and engineers prepared to detonate the first nuclear explosive device. They called it “the Gadget.” At 5:29 a.m., a flash erupted so intensely bright that it briefly blinded even through the lenses. One of the scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, thought of the Hindu scriptures that had inspired him since youth: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one.” Oppenheimer felt the weight of the purpose to which this awesome power — roughly equivalent to 44 million pounds of TNT, plus lethal radioactivity — would be put, and another line from the Bhagavad-Gita sprang to mind. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Three weeks later, on Aug. 6, a device on the same now-proven principles fell...over Hiroshima, Japan. Three days after that, on Aug. 9, a third bomb, essentially identical to the Gadget, was dropped on the port city of Nagasaki.

Journalists announce and discard eras as casually as bingo numbers, but a true historical dividing line was blasted into the sands of New Mexico. Before the blinding flash, only gods destroyed worlds. Then the power passed into human hands. That dividing line is so stark that it obscures the long path that led to our nuclear fate. The Bomb is often presented as a discrete choice, an option unmoored from history, unrelated to the countless choices and decisions, accidents and discoveries, that produced it. A simple yes or no: However, the Bomb is better understood as the terrible yet logical — and probably inevitable — result of a chain of developments in science, technology and the nature of war going back centuries. These developments moved in one direction only, toward ever more fearsome weapons and ever more catastrophic wars. This momentum made the nuclear age unavoidable.

Henry Stimson, the elderly secretary of war, alluded to this inevitability in April 1945. His memo to Truman brought the new president into the tight circle of secrecy around the development of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history,” as Stimson put it. The Allies were given no choice but to outrace the Germans and Japanese and Soviets to this weapon, for its scientific basis was known to physicists worldwide from the earliest days of the war. Unfortunately, the world’s “moral advancement” had not accelerated to keep pace with its technical proficiency, Stimson added ruefully, thus: “modern civilization might be completely destroyed.”

In the 75 years since,  the famous Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has never permitted much reason for hope...yet, the worst-case scenario remains in abeyance. What’s more, while the Bomb has not ended all wars, its menacing umbrella has spared the world from another industrial-scale conflagration among great powers. This is no small thing. During the last 31 years before the nuclear age, warfare consumed more than 100 million lives, the majority of them civilians. The only thing worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the unspeakable brutality that preceded them.

In the New Mexico desert, perhaps — perhaps — the world finally found a weapon awful enough to end the escalation.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

In the early darkness of a midsummer Monday in 1945, some of the world’s most brilliant scientists and engineers prepared to detonate the first nuclear explosive device. They called it “the Gadget.” At 5:29 a.m., a flash erupted so intensely bright that it briefly blinded even through the lenses. One of the scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, thought of the Hindu scriptures that had inspired him since youth: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one.” Oppenheimer felt the weight of the purpose to which this awesome power — roughly equivalent to 44 million pounds of TNT, plus lethal radioactivity — would be put, and another line from the Bhagavad-Gita sprang to mind. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Three weeks later, on Aug. 6, a device on the same now-proven principles fell...over Hiroshima, Japan. Three days after that, on Aug. 9, a third bomb, essentially identical to the Gadget, was dropped on the port city of Nagasaki.

Journalists announce and discard eras as casually as bingo numbers, but a true historical dividing line was blasted into the sands of New Mexico. Before the blinding flash, only gods destroyed worlds. Then the power passed into human hands. That dividing line is so stark that it obscures the long path that led to our nuclear fate. The Bomb is often presented as a discrete choice, an option unmoored from history, unrelated to the countless choices and decisions, accidents and discoveries, that produced it. A simple yes or no: However, the Bomb is better understood as the terrible yet logical — and probably inevitable — result of a chain of developments in science, technology and the nature of war going back centuries. These developments moved in one direction only, toward ever more fearsome weapons and ever more catastrophic wars. This momentum made the nuclear age unavoidable.

Henry Stimson, the elderly secretary of war, alluded to this inevitability in April 1945. His memo to Truman brought the new president into the tight circle of secrecy around the development of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history,” as Stimson put it. The Allies were given no choice but to outrace the Germans and Japanese and Soviets to this weapon, for its scientific basis was known to physicists worldwide from the earliest days of the war. Unfortunately, the world’s “moral advancement” had not accelerated to keep pace with its technical proficiency, Stimson added ruefully, thus: “modern civilization might be completely destroyed.”

In the 75 years since,  the famous Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has never permitted much reason for hope...yet, the worst-case scenario remains in abeyance. What’s more, while the Bomb has not ended all wars, its menacing umbrella has spared the world from another industrial-scale conflagration among great powers. This is no small thing. During the last 31 years before the nuclear age, warfare consumed more than 100 million lives, the majority of them civilians. The only thing worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the unspeakable brutality that preceded them.

In the New Mexico desert, perhaps — perhaps — the world finally found a weapon awful enough to end the escalation.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

In the early darkness of a midsummer Monday in 1945, some of the world’s most brilliant scientists and engineers prepared to detonate the first nuclear explosive device. They called it “the Gadget.” At 5:29 a.m., a flash erupted so intensely bright that it briefly blinded even through the lenses. One of the scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, thought of the Hindu scriptures that had inspired him since youth: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one.” Oppenheimer felt the weight of the purpose to which this awesome power — roughly equivalent to 44 million pounds of TNT, plus lethal radioactivity — would be put, and another line from the Bhagavad-Gita sprang to mind. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Three weeks later, on Aug. 6, a device on the same now-proven principles fell...over Hiroshima, Japan. Three days after that, on Aug. 9, a third bomb, essentially identical to the Gadget, was dropped on the port city of Nagasaki.

Journalists announce and discard eras as casually as bingo numbers, but a true historical dividing line was blasted into the sands of New Mexico. Before the blinding flash, only gods destroyed worlds. Then the power passed into human hands. That dividing line is so stark that it obscures the long path that led to our nuclear fate. The Bomb is often presented as a discrete choice, an option unmoored from history, unrelated to the countless choices and decisions, accidents and discoveries, that produced it. A simple yes or no: However, the Bomb is better understood as the terrible yet logical — and probably inevitable — result of a chain of developments in science, technology and the nature of war going back centuries. These developments moved in one direction only, toward ever more fearsome weapons and ever more catastrophic wars. This momentum made the nuclear age unavoidable.

Henry Stimson, the elderly secretary of war, alluded to this inevitability in April 1945. His memo to Truman brought the new president into the tight circle of secrecy around the development of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history,” as Stimson put it. The Allies were given no choice but to outrace the Germans and Japanese and Soviets to this weapon, for its scientific basis was known to physicists worldwide from the earliest days of the war. Unfortunately, the world’s “moral advancement” had not accelerated to keep pace with its technical proficiency, Stimson added ruefully, thus: “modern civilization might be completely destroyed.”

In the 75 years since,  the famous Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has never permitted much reason for hope...yet, the worst-case scenario remains in abeyance. What’s more, while the Bomb has not ended all wars, its menacing umbrella has spared the world from another industrial-scale conflagration among great powers. This is no small thing. During the last 31 years before the nuclear age, warfare consumed more than 100 million lives, the majority of them civilians. The only thing worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the unspeakable brutality that preceded them.

In the New Mexico desert, perhaps — perhaps — the world finally found a weapon awful enough to end the escalation.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

In the early darkness of a midsummer Monday in 1945, some of the world’s most brilliant scientists and engineers prepared to detonate the first nuclear explosive device. They called it “the Gadget.” At 5:29 a.m., a flash erupted so intensely bright that it briefly blinded even through the lenses. One of the scientists, J. Robert Oppenheimer, thought of the Hindu scriptures that had inspired him since youth: “If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendour of the mighty one.” Oppenheimer felt the weight of the purpose to which this awesome power — roughly equivalent to 44 million pounds of TNT, plus lethal radioactivity — would be put, and another line from the Bhagavad-Gita sprang to mind. “I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.”

Three weeks later, on Aug. 6, a device on the same now-proven principles fell...over Hiroshima, Japan. Three days after that, on Aug. 9, a third bomb, essentially identical to the Gadget, was dropped on the port city of Nagasaki.

Journalists announce and discard eras as casually as bingo numbers, but a true historical dividing line was blasted into the sands of New Mexico. Before the blinding flash, only gods destroyed worlds. Then the power passed into human hands. That dividing line is so stark that it obscures the long path that led to our nuclear fate. The Bomb is often presented as a discrete choice, an option unmoored from history, unrelated to the countless choices and decisions, accidents and discoveries, that produced it. A simple yes or no: However, the Bomb is better understood as the terrible yet logical — and probably inevitable — result of a chain of developments in science, technology and the nature of war going back centuries. These developments moved in one direction only, toward ever more fearsome weapons and ever more catastrophic wars. This momentum made the nuclear age unavoidable.

Henry Stimson, the elderly secretary of war, alluded to this inevitability in April 1945. His memo to Truman brought the new president into the tight circle of secrecy around the development of “the most terrible weapon ever known in human history,” as Stimson put it. The Allies were given no choice but to outrace the Germans and Japanese and Soviets to this weapon, for its scientific basis was known to physicists worldwide from the earliest days of the war. Unfortunately, the world’s “moral advancement” had not accelerated to keep pace with its technical proficiency, Stimson added ruefully, thus: “modern civilization might be completely destroyed.”

In the 75 years since,  the famous Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has never permitted much reason for hope...yet, the worst-case scenario remains in abeyance. What’s more, while the Bomb has not ended all wars, its menacing umbrella has spared the world from another industrial-scale conflagration among great powers. This is no small thing. During the last 31 years before the nuclear age, warfare consumed more than 100 million lives, the majority of them civilians. The only thing worse than Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the unspeakable brutality that preceded them.

In the New Mexico desert, perhaps — perhaps — the world finally found a weapon awful enough to end the escalation.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

It’s been two decades since the Human Genome Project first unveiled a rough draft of our genetic instruction book. The promise of that medical moon shot was that doctors would soon be able to look at an individual’s DNA and prescribe the right medicines for that person’s illness or even prevent certain diseases. That promise, known as precision medicine, has yet to be fulfilled in any widespread way. True, researchers are getting clues about some genetic variants linked to certain conditions and some that affect how drugs work in the body. But many of those advances have benefited just one group: people whose ancestral roots stem from Europe. In other words, white people.

Instead of a truly human genome that represents everyone, “what we have is essentially a European genome,” says Constance Hilliard, an evolutionary historian at the University of North Texas in Denton. “That data doesn’t work for anybody apart from people of European ancestry.” She’s talking about more than the Human Genome Project’s reference genome. That database is just one of many that researchers are using to develop precision medicine strategies. Often those genetic databases draw on data mainly from white participants. But race isn’t the issue. The problem is that collectively, those data add up to a catalog of genetic variants that don’t represent the full range of human genetic diversity.

One solution is to make customized reference genomes for populations whose members die from cancer or heart disease at higher rates than other groups, for example, or who face other worse health outcomes, Hilliard suggests. Hilliard’s hypothesis is that precision medicine, which tailors treatments based on a person’s genetic data, lifestyle, environment and physiology, is more likely to succeed when researchers consider the histories of groups that have worse health outcomes.

And the more specific the better. For instance, African Americans who descended from enslaved people have geographic and ecological origins as well as evolutionary and social histories distinct from those of recent African immigrants to the United States. Those histories have left stamps in the DNA that can make a difference in people’s health today. The same goes for Indigenous people from various parts of the world and Latino people from Mexico versus the Caribbean or Central or South America.

Results of a survey conducted by Science News revealed that one big drawback to Hilliard’s proposal may be social rather than scientific. Many respondents expressed concern that even well-intentioned scientists might do research that ultimately increases bias and discrimination toward certain groups. As one respondent put it, “The idea of diversity is being stretched into an arena where racial differences will be emphasized and commonalities minimized. The fear is that any differences that are found would be exploited by those who want to denigrate others. This is truly the entry to a racist philosophy.” Indeed, the Chinese government has come under fire for using DNA to identify members of the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, singling them out for surveillance and sending some to “reeducation camps.”

Hilliard says that the argument that minorities become more vulnerable when they open themselves to genetic research is valid. “Genomics, like nuclear fusion, can be weaponized and dangerous,” she says in response to respondents' concerns. “Minorities can choose to be left out of the genomic revolution or they can make full use of it,” by adding their genetic data to the mix.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

It’s been two decades since the Human Genome Project first unveiled a rough draft of our genetic instruction book. The promise of that medical moon shot was that doctors would soon be able to look at an individual’s DNA and prescribe the right medicines for that person’s illness or even prevent certain diseases. That promise, known as precision medicine, has yet to be fulfilled in any widespread way. True, researchers are getting clues about some genetic variants linked to certain conditions and some that affect how drugs work in the body. But many of those advances have benefited just one group: people whose ancestral roots stem from Europe. In other words, white people.

Instead of a truly human genome that represents everyone, “what we have is essentially a European genome,” says Constance Hilliard, an evolutionary historian at the University of North Texas in Denton. “That data doesn’t work for anybody apart from people of European ancestry.” She’s talking about more than the Human Genome Project’s reference genome. That database is just one of many that researchers are using to develop precision medicine strategies. Often those genetic databases draw on data mainly from white participants. But race isn’t the issue. The problem is that collectively, those data add up to a catalog of genetic variants that don’t represent the full range of human genetic diversity.

One solution is to make customized reference genomes for populations whose members die from cancer or heart disease at higher rates than other groups, for example, or who face other worse health outcomes, Hilliard suggests. Hilliard’s hypothesis is that precision medicine, which tailors treatments based on a person’s genetic data, lifestyle, environment and physiology, is more likely to succeed when researchers consider the histories of groups that have worse health outcomes.

And the more specific the better. For instance, African Americans who descended from enslaved people have geographic and ecological origins as well as evolutionary and social histories distinct from those of recent African immigrants to the United States. Those histories have left stamps in the DNA that can make a difference in people’s health today. The same goes for Indigenous people from various parts of the world and Latino people from Mexico versus the Caribbean or Central or South America.

Results of a survey conducted by Science News revealed that one big drawback to Hilliard’s proposal may be social rather than scientific. Many respondents expressed concern that even well-intentioned scientists might do research that ultimately increases bias and discrimination toward certain groups. As one respondent put it, “The idea of diversity is being stretched into an arena where racial differences will be emphasized and commonalities minimized. The fear is that any differences that are found would be exploited by those who want to denigrate others. This is truly the entry to a racist philosophy.” Indeed, the Chinese government has come under fire for using DNA to identify members of the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, singling them out for surveillance and sending some to “reeducation camps.”

Hilliard says that the argument that minorities become more vulnerable when they open themselves to genetic research is valid. “Genomics, like nuclear fusion, can be weaponized and dangerous,” she says in response to respondents' concerns. “Minorities can choose to be left out of the genomic revolution or they can make full use of it,” by adding their genetic data to the mix.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

It’s been two decades since the Human Genome Project first unveiled a rough draft of our genetic instruction book. The promise of that medical moon shot was that doctors would soon be able to look at an individual’s DNA and prescribe the right medicines for that person’s illness or even prevent certain diseases. That promise, known as precision medicine, has yet to be fulfilled in any widespread way. True, researchers are getting clues about some genetic variants linked to certain conditions and some that affect how drugs work in the body. But many of those advances have benefited just one group: people whose ancestral roots stem from Europe. In other words, white people.

Instead of a truly human genome that represents everyone, “what we have is essentially a European genome,” says Constance Hilliard, an evolutionary historian at the University of North Texas in Denton. “That data doesn’t work for anybody apart from people of European ancestry.” She’s talking about more than the Human Genome Project’s reference genome. That database is just one of many that researchers are using to develop precision medicine strategies. Often those genetic databases draw on data mainly from white participants. But race isn’t the issue. The problem is that collectively, those data add up to a catalog of genetic variants that don’t represent the full range of human genetic diversity.

One solution is to make customized reference genomes for populations whose members die from cancer or heart disease at higher rates than other groups, for example, or who face other worse health outcomes, Hilliard suggests. Hilliard’s hypothesis is that precision medicine, which tailors treatments based on a person’s genetic data, lifestyle, environment and physiology, is more likely to succeed when researchers consider the histories of groups that have worse health outcomes.

And the more specific the better. For instance, African Americans who descended from enslaved people have geographic and ecological origins as well as evolutionary and social histories distinct from those of recent African immigrants to the United States. Those histories have left stamps in the DNA that can make a difference in people’s health today. The same goes for Indigenous people from various parts of the world and Latino people from Mexico versus the Caribbean or Central or South America.

Results of a survey conducted by Science News revealed that one big drawback to Hilliard’s proposal may be social rather than scientific. Many respondents expressed concern that even well-intentioned scientists might do research that ultimately increases bias and discrimination toward certain groups. As one respondent put it, “The idea of diversity is being stretched into an arena where racial differences will be emphasized and commonalities minimized. The fear is that any differences that are found would be exploited by those who want to denigrate others. This is truly the entry to a racist philosophy.” Indeed, the Chinese government has come under fire for using DNA to identify members of the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, singling them out for surveillance and sending some to “reeducation camps.”

Hilliard says that the argument that minorities become more vulnerable when they open themselves to genetic research is valid. “Genomics, like nuclear fusion, can be weaponized and dangerous,” she says in response to respondents' concerns. “Minorities can choose to be left out of the genomic revolution or they can make full use of it,” by adding their genetic data to the mix.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

It’s been two decades since the Human Genome Project first unveiled a rough draft of our genetic instruction book. The promise of that medical moon shot was that doctors would soon be able to look at an individual’s DNA and prescribe the right medicines for that person’s illness or even prevent certain diseases. That promise, known as precision medicine, has yet to be fulfilled in any widespread way. True, researchers are getting clues about some genetic variants linked to certain conditions and some that affect how drugs work in the body. But many of those advances have benefited just one group: people whose ancestral roots stem from Europe. In other words, white people.

Instead of a truly human genome that represents everyone, “what we have is essentially a European genome,” says Constance Hilliard, an evolutionary historian at the University of North Texas in Denton. “That data doesn’t work for anybody apart from people of European ancestry.” She’s talking about more than the Human Genome Project’s reference genome. That database is just one of many that researchers are using to develop precision medicine strategies. Often those genetic databases draw on data mainly from white participants. But race isn’t the issue. The problem is that collectively, those data add up to a catalog of genetic variants that don’t represent the full range of human genetic diversity.

One solution is to make customized reference genomes for populations whose members die from cancer or heart disease at higher rates than other groups, for example, or who face other worse health outcomes, Hilliard suggests. Hilliard’s hypothesis is that precision medicine, which tailors treatments based on a person’s genetic data, lifestyle, environment and physiology, is more likely to succeed when researchers consider the histories of groups that have worse health outcomes.

And the more specific the better. For instance, African Americans who descended from enslaved people have geographic and ecological origins as well as evolutionary and social histories distinct from those of recent African immigrants to the United States. Those histories have left stamps in the DNA that can make a difference in people’s health today. The same goes for Indigenous people from various parts of the world and Latino people from Mexico versus the Caribbean or Central or South America.

Results of a survey conducted by Science News revealed that one big drawback to Hilliard’s proposal may be social rather than scientific. Many respondents expressed concern that even well-intentioned scientists might do research that ultimately increases bias and discrimination toward certain groups. As one respondent put it, “The idea of diversity is being stretched into an arena where racial differences will be emphasized and commonalities minimized. The fear is that any differences that are found would be exploited by those who want to denigrate others. This is truly the entry to a racist philosophy.” Indeed, the Chinese government has come under fire for using DNA to identify members of the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, singling them out for surveillance and sending some to “reeducation camps.”

Hilliard says that the argument that minorities become more vulnerable when they open themselves to genetic research is valid. “Genomics, like nuclear fusion, can be weaponized and dangerous,” she says in response to respondents' concerns. “Minorities can choose to be left out of the genomic revolution or they can make full use of it,” by adding their genetic data to the mix.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

It’s been two decades since the Human Genome Project first unveiled a rough draft of our genetic instruction book. The promise of that medical moon shot was that doctors would soon be able to look at an individual’s DNA and prescribe the right medicines for that person’s illness or even prevent certain diseases. That promise, known as precision medicine, has yet to be fulfilled in any widespread way. True, researchers are getting clues about some genetic variants linked to certain conditions and some that affect how drugs work in the body. But many of those advances have benefited just one group: people whose ancestral roots stem from Europe. In other words, white people.

Instead of a truly human genome that represents everyone, “what we have is essentially a European genome,” says Constance Hilliard, an evolutionary historian at the University of North Texas in Denton. “That data doesn’t work for anybody apart from people of European ancestry.” She’s talking about more than the Human Genome Project’s reference genome. That database is just one of many that researchers are using to develop precision medicine strategies. Often those genetic databases draw on data mainly from white participants. But race isn’t the issue. The problem is that collectively, those data add up to a catalog of genetic variants that don’t represent the full range of human genetic diversity.

One solution is to make customized reference genomes for populations whose members die from cancer or heart disease at higher rates than other groups, for example, or who face other worse health outcomes, Hilliard suggests. Hilliard’s hypothesis is that precision medicine, which tailors treatments based on a person’s genetic data, lifestyle, environment and physiology, is more likely to succeed when researchers consider the histories of groups that have worse health outcomes.

And the more specific the better. For instance, African Americans who descended from enslaved people have geographic and ecological origins as well as evolutionary and social histories distinct from those of recent African immigrants to the United States. Those histories have left stamps in the DNA that can make a difference in people’s health today. The same goes for Indigenous people from various parts of the world and Latino people from Mexico versus the Caribbean or Central or South America.

Results of a survey conducted by Science News revealed that one big drawback to Hilliard’s proposal may be social rather than scientific. Many respondents expressed concern that even well-intentioned scientists might do research that ultimately increases bias and discrimination toward certain groups. As one respondent put it, “The idea of diversity is being stretched into an arena where racial differences will be emphasized and commonalities minimized. The fear is that any differences that are found would be exploited by those who want to denigrate others. This is truly the entry to a racist philosophy.” Indeed, the Chinese government has come under fire for using DNA to identify members of the Uighur Muslim ethnic group, singling them out for surveillance and sending some to “reeducation camps.”

Hilliard says that the argument that minorities become more vulnerable when they open themselves to genetic research is valid. “Genomics, like nuclear fusion, can be weaponized and dangerous,” she says in response to respondents' concerns. “Minorities can choose to be left out of the genomic revolution or they can make full use of it,” by adding their genetic data to the mix.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Cryptocurrencies have long been heralded as the future of finance, but it wasn’t until 2020 that it finally caught on to an old idea: making money with money. In the crypto world, decentralized finance (or DeFi) encompasses a wide array of blockchain-based applications intended to enhance cryptocurrency holders’ returns without relying on intermediaries — to earn the kind of passive returns an investor might get from a savings account, a Treasury bill, or an Apple Inc. bond.

The idea seems to be catching fire: Deposits in DeFi applications grew from about $1 billion in June to just under $40 billion by late January 2021, suggesting that DeFi could be a major element of crypto from here on out. In the tradition of disruptive innovations — as Clayton Christensen envisioned them — DeFi can be the evolution of blockchain technology that might launch it into mainstream.

The premise of DeFi is simple: Fix the longstanding inefficiency in crypto finance of capital being kept idle at a nonzero opportunity cost. Now, most investors buy crypto with the hope that the value of the currency itself will rise, as Bitcoin has. In general, that strategy has worked just fine. The value of cryptocurrencies has appreciated so rapidly that there just wasn’t much incentive to worry about gains of a few percent here and there.

But the recent rise of stablecoins, which are designed keep their value constant, has changed that calculation. The combined market cap of stablecoins such as Terra and USDC has more than quadrupled in 2020. Now, vast passive income opportunities are being awakened by DeFi.

The appeal of a lower-risk approach to crypto is obvious and has the potential to expand the pool of investors. For the first time, it’s possible to be compensated for owning cryptos (even in the absence of price appreciation), which brings real, tangible utilities to digital currencies and changes the narrative of an asset class whose sole purpose used to be about being sold at a higher price. Therefore, many of the DeFi protocols today might have the potential to become big and bold enough to rival their centralized counterparts, while staying true to their decentralized roots. Furthermore, with volatility out of the picture and the promise of more stable returns, institutional investors are now considering crypto as part of their investments in alternatives.

The search for passive returns on crypto assets, called “yield farming,” is already taking shape on a number of new lending platforms. Compound Labs has launched one of the biggest DeFi lending platforms, where users can now borrow and lend any cryptocurrency on a short-term basis at algorithmically determined rates. A prototypical yield farmer moves assets around pools on Compound, constantly chasing the pool offering the highest annual percentage yield (APY). Practically, it echoes a strategy in traditional finance — a foreign currency carry trade — where a trader seeks to borrow the currency charging a lower interest rate and lend the one offering a higher return.

Crypto yield farming, however, offers more incentives. For instance, by depositing stablecoins into a digital account, investors would be rewarded in at least two ways. First, they receive the APY on their deposits. Second, and more importantly, certain protocols offer an additional subsidy, in the form of a new token, on top of the yield that it charges the borrower and pays to the lender.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Cryptocurrencies have long been heralded as the future of finance, but it wasn’t until 2020 that it finally caught on to an old idea: making money with money. In the crypto world, decentralized finance (or DeFi) encompasses a wide array of blockchain-based applications intended to enhance cryptocurrency holders’ returns without relying on intermediaries — to earn the kind of passive returns an investor might get from a savings account, a Treasury bill, or an Apple Inc. bond.

The idea seems to be catching fire: Deposits in DeFi applications grew from about $1 billion in June to just under $40 billion by late January 2021, suggesting that DeFi could be a major element of crypto from here on out. In the tradition of disruptive innovations — as Clayton Christensen envisioned them — DeFi can be the evolution of blockchain technology that might launch it into mainstream.

The premise of DeFi is simple: Fix the longstanding inefficiency in crypto finance of capital being kept idle at a nonzero opportunity cost. Now, most investors buy crypto with the hope that the value of the currency itself will rise, as Bitcoin has. In general, that strategy has worked just fine. The value of cryptocurrencies has appreciated so rapidly that there just wasn’t much incentive to worry about gains of a few percent here and there.

But the recent rise of stablecoins, which are designed keep their value constant, has changed that calculation. The combined market cap of stablecoins such as Terra and USDC has more than quadrupled in 2020. Now, vast passive income opportunities are being awakened by DeFi.

The appeal of a lower-risk approach to crypto is obvious and has the potential to expand the pool of investors. For the first time, it’s possible to be compensated for owning cryptos (even in the absence of price appreciation), which brings real, tangible utilities to digital currencies and changes the narrative of an asset class whose sole purpose used to be about being sold at a higher price. Therefore, many of the DeFi protocols today might have the potential to become big and bold enough to rival their centralized counterparts, while staying true to their decentralized roots. Furthermore, with volatility out of the picture and the promise of more stable returns, institutional investors are now considering crypto as part of their investments in alternatives.

The search for passive returns on crypto assets, called “yield farming,” is already taking shape on a number of new lending platforms. Compound Labs has launched one of the biggest DeFi lending platforms, where users can now borrow and lend any cryptocurrency on a short-term basis at algorithmically determined rates. A prototypical yield farmer moves assets around pools on Compound, constantly chasing the pool offering the highest annual percentage yield (APY). Practically, it echoes a strategy in traditional finance — a foreign currency carry trade — where a trader seeks to borrow the currency charging a lower interest rate and lend the one offering a higher return.

Crypto yield farming, however, offers more incentives. For instance, by depositing stablecoins into a digital account, investors would be rewarded in at least two ways. First, they receive the APY on their deposits. Second, and more importantly, certain protocols offer an additional subsidy, in the form of a new token, on top of the yield that it charges the borrower and pays to the lender.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Cryptocurrencies have long been heralded as the future of finance, but it wasn’t until 2020 that it finally caught on to an old idea: making money with money. In the crypto world, decentralized finance (or DeFi) encompasses a wide array of blockchain-based applications intended to enhance cryptocurrency holders’ returns without relying on intermediaries — to earn the kind of passive returns an investor might get from a savings account, a Treasury bill, or an Apple Inc. bond.

The idea seems to be catching fire: Deposits in DeFi applications grew from about $1 billion in June to just under $40 billion by late January 2021, suggesting that DeFi could be a major element of crypto from here on out. In the tradition of disruptive innovations — as Clayton Christensen envisioned them — DeFi can be the evolution of blockchain technology that might launch it into mainstream.

The premise of DeFi is simple: Fix the longstanding inefficiency in crypto finance of capital being kept idle at a nonzero opportunity cost. Now, most investors buy crypto with the hope that the value of the currency itself will rise, as Bitcoin has. In general, that strategy has worked just fine. The value of cryptocurrencies has appreciated so rapidly that there just wasn’t much incentive to worry about gains of a few percent here and there.

But the recent rise of stablecoins, which are designed keep their value constant, has changed that calculation. The combined market cap of stablecoins such as Terra and USDC has more than quadrupled in 2020. Now, vast passive income opportunities are being awakened by DeFi.

The appeal of a lower-risk approach to crypto is obvious and has the potential to expand the pool of investors. For the first time, it’s possible to be compensated for owning cryptos (even in the absence of price appreciation), which brings real, tangible utilities to digital currencies and changes the narrative of an asset class whose sole purpose used to be about being sold at a higher price. Therefore, many of the DeFi protocols today might have the potential to become big and bold enough to rival their centralized counterparts, while staying true to their decentralized roots. Furthermore, with volatility out of the picture and the promise of more stable returns, institutional investors are now considering crypto as part of their investments in alternatives.

The search for passive returns on crypto assets, called “yield farming,” is already taking shape on a number of new lending platforms. Compound Labs has launched one of the biggest DeFi lending platforms, where users can now borrow and lend any cryptocurrency on a short-term basis at algorithmically determined rates. A prototypical yield farmer moves assets around pools on Compound, constantly chasing the pool offering the highest annual percentage yield (APY). Practically, it echoes a strategy in traditional finance — a foreign currency carry trade — where a trader seeks to borrow the currency charging a lower interest rate and lend the one offering a higher return.

Crypto yield farming, however, offers more incentives. For instance, by depositing stablecoins into a digital account, investors would be rewarded in at least two ways. First, they receive the APY on their deposits. Second, and more importantly, certain protocols offer an additional subsidy, in the form of a new token, on top of the yield that it charges the borrower and pays to the lender.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Cryptocurrencies have long been heralded as the future of finance, but it wasn’t until 2020 that it finally caught on to an old idea: making money with money. In the crypto world, decentralized finance (or DeFi) encompasses a wide array of blockchain-based applications intended to enhance cryptocurrency holders’ returns without relying on intermediaries — to earn the kind of passive returns an investor might get from a savings account, a Treasury bill, or an Apple Inc. bond.

The idea seems to be catching fire: Deposits in DeFi applications grew from about $1 billion in June to just under $40 billion by late January 2021, suggesting that DeFi could be a major element of crypto from here on out. In the tradition of disruptive innovations — as Clayton Christensen envisioned them — DeFi can be the evolution of blockchain technology that might launch it into mainstream.

The premise of DeFi is simple: Fix the longstanding inefficiency in crypto finance of capital being kept idle at a nonzero opportunity cost. Now, most investors buy crypto with the hope that the value of the currency itself will rise, as Bitcoin has. In general, that strategy has worked just fine. The value of cryptocurrencies has appreciated so rapidly that there just wasn’t much incentive to worry about gains of a few percent here and there.

But the recent rise of stablecoins, which are designed keep their value constant, has changed that calculation. The combined market cap of stablecoins such as Terra and USDC has more than quadrupled in 2020. Now, vast passive income opportunities are being awakened by DeFi.

The appeal of a lower-risk approach to crypto is obvious and has the potential to expand the pool of investors. For the first time, it’s possible to be compensated for owning cryptos (even in the absence of price appreciation), which brings real, tangible utilities to digital currencies and changes the narrative of an asset class whose sole purpose used to be about being sold at a higher price. Therefore, many of the DeFi protocols today might have the potential to become big and bold enough to rival their centralized counterparts, while staying true to their decentralized roots. Furthermore, with volatility out of the picture and the promise of more stable returns, institutional investors are now considering crypto as part of their investments in alternatives.

The search for passive returns on crypto assets, called “yield farming,” is already taking shape on a number of new lending platforms. Compound Labs has launched one of the biggest DeFi lending platforms, where users can now borrow and lend any cryptocurrency on a short-term basis at algorithmically determined rates. A prototypical yield farmer moves assets around pools on Compound, constantly chasing the pool offering the highest annual percentage yield (APY). Practically, it echoes a strategy in traditional finance — a foreign currency carry trade — where a trader seeks to borrow the currency charging a lower interest rate and lend the one offering a higher return.

Crypto yield farming, however, offers more incentives. For instance, by depositing stablecoins into a digital account, investors would be rewarded in at least two ways. First, they receive the APY on their deposits. Second, and more importantly, certain protocols offer an additional subsidy, in the form of a new token, on top of the yield that it charges the borrower and pays to the lender.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Cryptocurrencies have long been heralded as the future of finance, but it wasn’t until 2020 that it finally caught on to an old idea: making money with money. In the crypto world, decentralized finance (or DeFi) encompasses a wide array of blockchain-based applications intended to enhance cryptocurrency holders’ returns without relying on intermediaries — to earn the kind of passive returns an investor might get from a savings account, a Treasury bill, or an Apple Inc. bond.

The idea seems to be catching fire: Deposits in DeFi applications grew from about $1 billion in June to just under $40 billion by late January 2021, suggesting that DeFi could be a major element of crypto from here on out. In the tradition of disruptive innovations — as Clayton Christensen envisioned them — DeFi can be the evolution of blockchain technology that might launch it into mainstream.

The premise of DeFi is simple: Fix the longstanding inefficiency in crypto finance of capital being kept idle at a nonzero opportunity cost. Now, most investors buy crypto with the hope that the value of the currency itself will rise, as Bitcoin has. In general, that strategy has worked just fine. The value of cryptocurrencies has appreciated so rapidly that there just wasn’t much incentive to worry about gains of a few percent here and there.

But the recent rise of stablecoins, which are designed keep their value constant, has changed that calculation. The combined market cap of stablecoins such as Terra and USDC has more than quadrupled in 2020. Now, vast passive income opportunities are being awakened by DeFi.

The appeal of a lower-risk approach to crypto is obvious and has the potential to expand the pool of investors. For the first time, it’s possible to be compensated for owning cryptos (even in the absence of price appreciation), which brings real, tangible utilities to digital currencies and changes the narrative of an asset class whose sole purpose used to be about being sold at a higher price. Therefore, many of the DeFi protocols today might have the potential to become big and bold enough to rival their centralized counterparts, while staying true to their decentralized roots. Furthermore, with volatility out of the picture and the promise of more stable returns, institutional investors are now considering crypto as part of their investments in alternatives.

The search for passive returns on crypto assets, called “yield farming,” is already taking shape on a number of new lending platforms. Compound Labs has launched one of the biggest DeFi lending platforms, where users can now borrow and lend any cryptocurrency on a short-term basis at algorithmically determined rates. A prototypical yield farmer moves assets around pools on Compound, constantly chasing the pool offering the highest annual percentage yield (APY). Practically, it echoes a strategy in traditional finance — a foreign currency carry trade — where a trader seeks to borrow the currency charging a lower interest rate and lend the one offering a higher return.

Crypto yield farming, however, offers more incentives. For instance, by depositing stablecoins into a digital account, investors would be rewarded in at least two ways. First, they receive the APY on their deposits. Second, and more importantly, certain protocols offer an additional subsidy, in the form of a new token, on top of the yield that it charges the borrower and pays to the lender.

correct answer:- 3

---

correct answer:- 3421

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correct answer:- 3

---

correct answer:- 5

---

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Recognising our feelings of grief is important, not only because we cannot mourn our losses if we do not acknowledge them, but also because the literature and science of grief offer guidance for how to respond to this pandemic in ways that make psychological healing possible. In his 2008 book, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression, the psychoanalyst Darian Leader argues that British society has lost a vital connection to grief, preferring to interpret the pain of unacknowledged or unresolved loss and separation medically, as depression, and opting for what he calls “mental hygiene” - the management of troublesome, superficial symptoms - over the deeper, harder work of mourning. We do not find it easy, in this culture of self-optimisation and life-hacks, to accept that grief is not something you can “get over”, that there is no cure for pain. The act of mourning is not to recover from loss, Leader argues, but rather to find a way to accommodate and live with it. And, if we put off or bypass the work of mourning, the pain of our losses will return to torment us, often in disruptive or unexpected ways.

The anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer argued that the mass deaths of the First World War so overwhelmed British communities that people began to abandon traditional mourning rituals, something that served to transform grief from a communal experience to a private emotion. The pandemic might be accelerating this process, as people are left to mourn alone in lockdown and to pay their final respects over Zoom. And yet, Darian Leader contends that we cannot properly mourn in isolation; mourning is a social task. “A loss, after all, always requires some kind of recognition, some sense that it has been witnessed and made real,” Leader writes. This is why we have such an elemental need to feel heard, why we make the effort to commemorate past conflicts, why post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions are less about punishment than recognising the crimes. The demands for a public inquiry into the British government’s pandemic response speaks to this need, and to another dimension of pandemic grief.

Leader argues that public displays of grief help facilitate individual mourning. In his view, it is through public ceremonies that people are able to access their own, personal grief. This is the function performed by traditions of hiring professional mourners to keen at funerals, and it helps explain why celebrity deaths sometimes unleash an outpouring of grief. The near-hysterical response to the death of Princess Diana in 1997 was not, as some newspapers contended, a mark of “mourning sickness” or “crocodile tears”. Rather, the public mood provided people with a way to access their grief over other, unrelated losses.

Those who study grief often point to the inevitability of pain. When people put off the business of mourning, the pain of loss and separation finds a way to reassert itself. Leader describes the phenomenon of “anniversary symptoms”, the findings that adult hospitalisation dates coincide remarkably with anniversaries of childhood losses, or that GP surgery records reveal that people often return to doctors in the same week or month as their previous visit. “Rather than access their memories, the body commemorates them,” Leader writes.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Recognising our feelings of grief is important, not only because we cannot mourn our losses if we do not acknowledge them, but also because the literature and science of grief offer guidance for how to respond to this pandemic in ways that make psychological healing possible. In his 2008 book, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression, the psychoanalyst Darian Leader argues that British society has lost a vital connection to grief, preferring to interpret the pain of unacknowledged or unresolved loss and separation medically, as depression, and opting for what he calls “mental hygiene” - the management of troublesome, superficial symptoms - over the deeper, harder work of mourning. We do not find it easy, in this culture of self-optimisation and life-hacks, to accept that grief is not something you can “get over”, that there is no cure for pain. The act of mourning is not to recover from loss, Leader argues, but rather to find a way to accommodate and live with it. And, if we put off or bypass the work of mourning, the pain of our losses will return to torment us, often in disruptive or unexpected ways.

The anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer argued that the mass deaths of the First World War so overwhelmed British communities that people began to abandon traditional mourning rituals, something that served to transform grief from a communal experience to a private emotion. The pandemic might be accelerating this process, as people are left to mourn alone in lockdown and to pay their final respects over Zoom. And yet, Darian Leader contends that we cannot properly mourn in isolation; mourning is a social task. “A loss, after all, always requires some kind of recognition, some sense that it has been witnessed and made real,” Leader writes. This is why we have such an elemental need to feel heard, why we make the effort to commemorate past conflicts, why post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions are less about punishment than recognising the crimes. The demands for a public inquiry into the British government’s pandemic response speaks to this need, and to another dimension of pandemic grief.

Leader argues that public displays of grief help facilitate individual mourning. In his view, it is through public ceremonies that people are able to access their own, personal grief. This is the function performed by traditions of hiring professional mourners to keen at funerals, and it helps explain why celebrity deaths sometimes unleash an outpouring of grief. The near-hysterical response to the death of Princess Diana in 1997 was not, as some newspapers contended, a mark of “mourning sickness” or “crocodile tears”. Rather, the public mood provided people with a way to access their grief over other, unrelated losses.

Those who study grief often point to the inevitability of pain. When people put off the business of mourning, the pain of loss and separation finds a way to reassert itself. Leader describes the phenomenon of “anniversary symptoms”, the findings that adult hospitalisation dates coincide remarkably with anniversaries of childhood losses, or that GP surgery records reveal that people often return to doctors in the same week or month as their previous visit. “Rather than access their memories, the body commemorates them,” Leader writes.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Recognising our feelings of grief is important, not only because we cannot mourn our losses if we do not acknowledge them, but also because the literature and science of grief offer guidance for how to respond to this pandemic in ways that make psychological healing possible. In his 2008 book, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression, the psychoanalyst Darian Leader argues that British society has lost a vital connection to grief, preferring to interpret the pain of unacknowledged or unresolved loss and separation medically, as depression, and opting for what he calls “mental hygiene” - the management of troublesome, superficial symptoms - over the deeper, harder work of mourning. We do not find it easy, in this culture of self-optimisation and life-hacks, to accept that grief is not something you can “get over”, that there is no cure for pain. The act of mourning is not to recover from loss, Leader argues, but rather to find a way to accommodate and live with it. And, if we put off or bypass the work of mourning, the pain of our losses will return to torment us, often in disruptive or unexpected ways.

The anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer argued that the mass deaths of the First World War so overwhelmed British communities that people began to abandon traditional mourning rituals, something that served to transform grief from a communal experience to a private emotion. The pandemic might be accelerating this process, as people are left to mourn alone in lockdown and to pay their final respects over Zoom. And yet, Darian Leader contends that we cannot properly mourn in isolation; mourning is a social task. “A loss, after all, always requires some kind of recognition, some sense that it has been witnessed and made real,” Leader writes. This is why we have such an elemental need to feel heard, why we make the effort to commemorate past conflicts, why post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions are less about punishment than recognising the crimes. The demands for a public inquiry into the British government’s pandemic response speaks to this need, and to another dimension of pandemic grief.

Leader argues that public displays of grief help facilitate individual mourning. In his view, it is through public ceremonies that people are able to access their own, personal grief. This is the function performed by traditions of hiring professional mourners to keen at funerals, and it helps explain why celebrity deaths sometimes unleash an outpouring of grief. The near-hysterical response to the death of Princess Diana in 1997 was not, as some newspapers contended, a mark of “mourning sickness” or “crocodile tears”. Rather, the public mood provided people with a way to access their grief over other, unrelated losses.

Those who study grief often point to the inevitability of pain. When people put off the business of mourning, the pain of loss and separation finds a way to reassert itself. Leader describes the phenomenon of “anniversary symptoms”, the findings that adult hospitalisation dates coincide remarkably with anniversaries of childhood losses, or that GP surgery records reveal that people often return to doctors in the same week or month as their previous visit. “Rather than access their memories, the body commemorates them,” Leader writes.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Recognising our feelings of grief is important, not only because we cannot mourn our losses if we do not acknowledge them, but also because the literature and science of grief offer guidance for how to respond to this pandemic in ways that make psychological healing possible. In his 2008 book, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia and Depression, the psychoanalyst Darian Leader argues that British society has lost a vital connection to grief, preferring to interpret the pain of unacknowledged or unresolved loss and separation medically, as depression, and opting for what he calls “mental hygiene” - the management of troublesome, superficial symptoms - over the deeper, harder work of mourning. We do not find it easy, in this culture of self-optimisation and life-hacks, to accept that grief is not something you can “get over”, that there is no cure for pain. The act of mourning is not to recover from loss, Leader argues, but rather to find a way to accommodate and live with it. And, if we put off or bypass the work of mourning, the pain of our losses will return to torment us, often in disruptive or unexpected ways.

The anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer argued that the mass deaths of the First World War so overwhelmed British communities that people began to abandon traditional mourning rituals, something that served to transform grief from a communal experience to a private emotion. The pandemic might be accelerating this process, as people are left to mourn alone in lockdown and to pay their final respects over Zoom. And yet, Darian Leader contends that we cannot properly mourn in isolation; mourning is a social task. “A loss, after all, always requires some kind of recognition, some sense that it has been witnessed and made real,” Leader writes. This is why we have such an elemental need to feel heard, why we make the effort to commemorate past conflicts, why post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions are less about punishment than recognising the crimes. The demands for a public inquiry into the British government’s pandemic response speaks to this need, and to another dimension of pandemic grief.

Leader argues that public displays of grief help facilitate individual mourning. In his view, it is through public ceremonies that people are able to access their own, personal grief. This is the function performed by traditions of hiring professional mourners to keen at funerals, and it helps explain why celebrity deaths sometimes unleash an outpouring of grief. The near-hysterical response to the death of Princess Diana in 1997 was not, as some newspapers contended, a mark of “mourning sickness” or “crocodile tears”. Rather, the public mood provided people with a way to access their grief over other, unrelated losses.

Those who study grief often point to the inevitability of pain. When people put off the business of mourning, the pain of loss and separation finds a way to reassert itself. Leader describes the phenomenon of “anniversary symptoms”, the findings that adult hospitalisation dates coincide remarkably with anniversaries of childhood losses, or that GP surgery records reveal that people often return to doctors in the same week or month as their previous visit. “Rather than access their memories, the body commemorates them,” Leader writes.

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage and answer the following questions:

Like other artists, the actor is a kind of shaman. If the audience is lucky, we go with this emotional magician to other worlds and other versions of ourselves. Our enchantment or immersion into another world is not just theoretical, but sensory and emotional. The actor’s imagination has gone into emotional territories of intense feeling before us. Now they guide us like a psychopomp into those emotional territories by recreating them in front of us. Aristotle called this imaginative power phantasia. We might mistakenly think that phantasia is just for artists and entertainers, a rare and special talent, but it’s actually a cognitive faculty that functions in all human beings. The actor might guide us, but it’s our own imagination that enables us to immerse fully into the story. If we activate our power of phantasia, we voluntarily summon up the real emotions we see on stage: fear, anxiety, rage, love and more. In waking life, we see this voluntary phantasia at work but, for many of us, the richest experience of phantasia comes in sleep, when the involuntary imagination awakes in the form of dreams. During sleep, your body is turned off by the temporary paralysis of sleep atonia, but your limbic brain is running hot. In waking life, the limbic system is responsible for many of the basic mammalian survival aspects of our existence: emotions, attention and focus, and is deeply involved in the fight-or-flight response to danger. The dreaming brain isn’t just faking a battle but actually fighting one in our neuroendocrine axis. That’s why we sometimes wake up sweating with our heart racing.

An actor, for preparing a role, does not rely on direct observations of human behaviour alone. According to the extended mind theory, humans offload much of who they are into the environment. The philosophers David Chalmers and Andy Clark argue that our minds don’t reside exclusively in our brains or bodies, but extend out into the physical environment (in diaries, maps, calculators and now smartphones, etc). Consequently, you can learn a great deal about someone by spending time in their home - not deducing facts like Sherlock Holmes, but absorbing subtle understandings of character, taste, temperament and life history. When an actor prepares to play a historical figure, he might find deep insights in the extended mind - the written record, the physical environs, the clothing and so on. A small detail can turn the key and open up a real ‘visitation’ from the past. Stage actors ‘read the room’ in a similar way to our primate cousins reading their social world of dominance. A lifetime of subconsciously reading rooms (reading people) gives artists a rich palette of insights, feelings and behaviours.

For Plato, the imagination produces only illusion, which distracts from reality, itself apprehended by reason. The artist is concerned with producing images, which are merely shadows, reflecting, like a mirror, the surface of things, while Truth lies beyond the sensory world. In the Republic, Plato places imagery and art low on the ladder of knowledge and metaphysics, although ironically he tells us this in an imaginary allegory of the cave story. By contrast, Aristotle saw imagination as a necessary ingredient to knowledge. Memory is a repository of images and events, but imagination (phantasia) calls up, unites and combines those memories into tools for judgment and decision-making. Imagination constructs alternative scenarios from the raw data of empirical senses, and then our rational faculties can evaluate them and use them to make moral choices, or predict social behaviours, or even build better scientific theories.

correct answer:- 2

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage and answer the following questions:

Like other artists, the actor is a kind of shaman. If the audience is lucky, we go with this emotional magician to other worlds and other versions of ourselves. Our enchantment or immersion into another world is not just theoretical, but sensory and emotional. The actor’s imagination has gone into emotional territories of intense feeling before us. Now they guide us like a psychopomp into those emotional territories by recreating them in front of us. Aristotle called this imaginative power phantasia. We might mistakenly think that phantasia is just for artists and entertainers, a rare and special talent, but it’s actually a cognitive faculty that functions in all human beings. The actor might guide us, but it’s our own imagination that enables us to immerse fully into the story. If we activate our power of phantasia, we voluntarily summon up the real emotions we see on stage: fear, anxiety, rage, love and more. In waking life, we see this voluntary phantasia at work but, for many of us, the richest experience of phantasia comes in sleep, when the involuntary imagination awakes in the form of dreams. During sleep, your body is turned off by the temporary paralysis of sleep atonia, but your limbic brain is running hot. In waking life, the limbic system is responsible for many of the basic mammalian survival aspects of our existence: emotions, attention and focus, and is deeply involved in the fight-or-flight response to danger. The dreaming brain isn’t just faking a battle but actually fighting one in our neuroendocrine axis. That’s why we sometimes wake up sweating with our heart racing.

An actor, for preparing a role, does not rely on direct observations of human behaviour alone. According to the extended mind theory, humans offload much of who they are into the environment. The philosophers David Chalmers and Andy Clark argue that our minds don’t reside exclusively in our brains or bodies, but extend out into the physical environment (in diaries, maps, calculators and now smartphones, etc). Consequently, you can learn a great deal about someone by spending time in their home - not deducing facts like Sherlock Holmes, but absorbing subtle understandings of character, taste, temperament and life history. When an actor prepares to play a historical figure, he might find deep insights in the extended mind - the written record, the physical environs, the clothing and so on. A small detail can turn the key and open up a real ‘visitation’ from the past. Stage actors ‘read the room’ in a similar way to our primate cousins reading their social world of dominance. A lifetime of subconsciously reading rooms (reading people) gives artists a rich palette of insights, feelings and behaviours.

For Plato, the imagination produces only illusion, which distracts from reality, itself apprehended by reason. The artist is concerned with producing images, which are merely shadows, reflecting, like a mirror, the surface of things, while Truth lies beyond the sensory world. In the Republic, Plato places imagery and art low on the ladder of knowledge and metaphysics, although ironically he tells us this in an imaginary allegory of the cave story. By contrast, Aristotle saw imagination as a necessary ingredient to knowledge. Memory is a repository of images and events, but imagination (phantasia) calls up, unites and combines those memories into tools for judgment and decision-making. Imagination constructs alternative scenarios from the raw data of empirical senses, and then our rational faculties can evaluate them and use them to make moral choices, or predict social behaviours, or even build better scientific theories.

correct answer:- 2

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage and answer the following questions:

Like other artists, the actor is a kind of shaman. If the audience is lucky, we go with this emotional magician to other worlds and other versions of ourselves. Our enchantment or immersion into another world is not just theoretical, but sensory and emotional. The actor’s imagination has gone into emotional territories of intense feeling before us. Now they guide us like a psychopomp into those emotional territories by recreating them in front of us. Aristotle called this imaginative power phantasia. We might mistakenly think that phantasia is just for artists and entertainers, a rare and special talent, but it’s actually a cognitive faculty that functions in all human beings. The actor might guide us, but it’s our own imagination that enables us to immerse fully into the story. If we activate our power of phantasia, we voluntarily summon up the real emotions we see on stage: fear, anxiety, rage, love and more. In waking life, we see this voluntary phantasia at work but, for many of us, the richest experience of phantasia comes in sleep, when the involuntary imagination awakes in the form of dreams. During sleep, your body is turned off by the temporary paralysis of sleep atonia, but your limbic brain is running hot. In waking life, the limbic system is responsible for many of the basic mammalian survival aspects of our existence: emotions, attention and focus, and is deeply involved in the fight-or-flight response to danger. The dreaming brain isn’t just faking a battle but actually fighting one in our neuroendocrine axis. That’s why we sometimes wake up sweating with our heart racing.

An actor, for preparing a role, does not rely on direct observations of human behaviour alone. According to the extended mind theory, humans offload much of who they are into the environment. The philosophers David Chalmers and Andy Clark argue that our minds don’t reside exclusively in our brains or bodies, but extend out into the physical environment (in diaries, maps, calculators and now smartphones, etc). Consequently, you can learn a great deal about someone by spending time in their home - not deducing facts like Sherlock Holmes, but absorbing subtle understandings of character, taste, temperament and life history. When an actor prepares to play a historical figure, he might find deep insights in the extended mind - the written record, the physical environs, the clothing and so on. A small detail can turn the key and open up a real ‘visitation’ from the past. Stage actors ‘read the room’ in a similar way to our primate cousins reading their social world of dominance. A lifetime of subconsciously reading rooms (reading people) gives artists a rich palette of insights, feelings and behaviours.

For Plato, the imagination produces only illusion, which distracts from reality, itself apprehended by reason. The artist is concerned with producing images, which are merely shadows, reflecting, like a mirror, the surface of things, while Truth lies beyond the sensory world. In the Republic, Plato places imagery and art low on the ladder of knowledge and metaphysics, although ironically he tells us this in an imaginary allegory of the cave story. By contrast, Aristotle saw imagination as a necessary ingredient to knowledge. Memory is a repository of images and events, but imagination (phantasia) calls up, unites and combines those memories into tools for judgment and decision-making. Imagination constructs alternative scenarios from the raw data of empirical senses, and then our rational faculties can evaluate them and use them to make moral choices, or predict social behaviours, or even build better scientific theories.

correct answer:- 4

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage and answer the following questions:

Like other artists, the actor is a kind of shaman. If the audience is lucky, we go with this emotional magician to other worlds and other versions of ourselves. Our enchantment or immersion into another world is not just theoretical, but sensory and emotional. The actor’s imagination has gone into emotional territories of intense feeling before us. Now they guide us like a psychopomp into those emotional territories by recreating them in front of us. Aristotle called this imaginative power phantasia. We might mistakenly think that phantasia is just for artists and entertainers, a rare and special talent, but it’s actually a cognitive faculty that functions in all human beings. The actor might guide us, but it’s our own imagination that enables us to immerse fully into the story. If we activate our power of phantasia, we voluntarily summon up the real emotions we see on stage: fear, anxiety, rage, love and more. In waking life, we see this voluntary phantasia at work but, for many of us, the richest experience of phantasia comes in sleep, when the involuntary imagination awakes in the form of dreams. During sleep, your body is turned off by the temporary paralysis of sleep atonia, but your limbic brain is running hot. In waking life, the limbic system is responsible for many of the basic mammalian survival aspects of our existence: emotions, attention and focus, and is deeply involved in the fight-or-flight response to danger. The dreaming brain isn’t just faking a battle but actually fighting one in our neuroendocrine axis. That’s why we sometimes wake up sweating with our heart racing.

An actor, for preparing a role, does not rely on direct observations of human behaviour alone. According to the extended mind theory, humans offload much of who they are into the environment. The philosophers David Chalmers and Andy Clark argue that our minds don’t reside exclusively in our brains or bodies, but extend out into the physical environment (in diaries, maps, calculators and now smartphones, etc). Consequently, you can learn a great deal about someone by spending time in their home - not deducing facts like Sherlock Holmes, but absorbing subtle understandings of character, taste, temperament and life history. When an actor prepares to play a historical figure, he might find deep insights in the extended mind - the written record, the physical environs, the clothing and so on. A small detail can turn the key and open up a real ‘visitation’ from the past. Stage actors ‘read the room’ in a similar way to our primate cousins reading their social world of dominance. A lifetime of subconsciously reading rooms (reading people) gives artists a rich palette of insights, feelings and behaviours.

For Plato, the imagination produces only illusion, which distracts from reality, itself apprehended by reason. The artist is concerned with producing images, which are merely shadows, reflecting, like a mirror, the surface of things, while Truth lies beyond the sensory world. In the Republic, Plato places imagery and art low on the ladder of knowledge and metaphysics, although ironically he tells us this in an imaginary allegory of the cave story. By contrast, Aristotle saw imagination as a necessary ingredient to knowledge. Memory is a repository of images and events, but imagination (phantasia) calls up, unites and combines those memories into tools for judgment and decision-making. Imagination constructs alternative scenarios from the raw data of empirical senses, and then our rational faculties can evaluate them and use them to make moral choices, or predict social behaviours, or even build better scientific theories.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage and answer the following questions:

Like other artists, the actor is a kind of shaman. If the audience is lucky, we go with this emotional magician to other worlds and other versions of ourselves. Our enchantment or immersion into another world is not just theoretical, but sensory and emotional. The actor’s imagination has gone into emotional territories of intense feeling before us. Now they guide us like a psychopomp into those emotional territories by recreating them in front of us. Aristotle called this imaginative power phantasia. We might mistakenly think that phantasia is just for artists and entertainers, a rare and special talent, but it’s actually a cognitive faculty that functions in all human beings. The actor might guide us, but it’s our own imagination that enables us to immerse fully into the story. If we activate our power of phantasia, we voluntarily summon up the real emotions we see on stage: fear, anxiety, rage, love and more. In waking life, we see this voluntary phantasia at work but, for many of us, the richest experience of phantasia comes in sleep, when the involuntary imagination awakes in the form of dreams. During sleep, your body is turned off by the temporary paralysis of sleep atonia, but your limbic brain is running hot. In waking life, the limbic system is responsible for many of the basic mammalian survival aspects of our existence: emotions, attention and focus, and is deeply involved in the fight-or-flight response to danger. The dreaming brain isn’t just faking a battle but actually fighting one in our neuroendocrine axis. That’s why we sometimes wake up sweating with our heart racing.

An actor, for preparing a role, does not rely on direct observations of human behaviour alone. According to the extended mind theory, humans offload much of who they are into the environment. The philosophers David Chalmers and Andy Clark argue that our minds don’t reside exclusively in our brains or bodies, but extend out into the physical environment (in diaries, maps, calculators and now smartphones, etc). Consequently, you can learn a great deal about someone by spending time in their home - not deducing facts like Sherlock Holmes, but absorbing subtle understandings of character, taste, temperament and life history. When an actor prepares to play a historical figure, he might find deep insights in the extended mind - the written record, the physical environs, the clothing and so on. A small detail can turn the key and open up a real ‘visitation’ from the past. Stage actors ‘read the room’ in a similar way to our primate cousins reading their social world of dominance. A lifetime of subconsciously reading rooms (reading people) gives artists a rich palette of insights, feelings and behaviours.

For Plato, the imagination produces only illusion, which distracts from reality, itself apprehended by reason. The artist is concerned with producing images, which are merely shadows, reflecting, like a mirror, the surface of things, while Truth lies beyond the sensory world. In the Republic, Plato places imagery and art low on the ladder of knowledge and metaphysics, although ironically he tells us this in an imaginary allegory of the cave story. By contrast, Aristotle saw imagination as a necessary ingredient to knowledge. Memory is a repository of images and events, but imagination (phantasia) calls up, unites and combines those memories into tools for judgment and decision-making. Imagination constructs alternative scenarios from the raw data of empirical senses, and then our rational faculties can evaluate them and use them to make moral choices, or predict social behaviours, or even build better scientific theories.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Déjà vu — French for “already seen” — is a mental sensation of intense familiarity coupled with the awareness that the familiarity is mistaken. It’s a recognition we know is wrong, a memory we know doesn’t exist. This conflict between what we know and what we remember is why déjà vu feels so eerie — almost paranormal or out-of-body. This awareness is very common. Déjà vu is almost impossible to study — people are rarely hooked up to electrodes or undergoing internal scans when they experience it — so most information about the sensation comes from self-reports, which suggest at least two-thirds of people will experience this fleeting mental trickery at some point in their lives. People who travel often or who watch a lot of movies may be more prone to déjà vu than others who don’t. The sensation does not seem to occur before age 8-9 (or perhaps children younger than that don’t have the ability to describe it), and experiences of déjà vu become less common as we age.

But as for why we experience déjà vu at all — that’s less clear. Multiple theories attempt to explain it, with each being a potentially legitimate source of the sensation. Like a physical itch, the mental itch of déjà vu likely has many causes, experts say.

Probably the strongest theory, with some experimental backing, is that the false familiarity isn’t a sign of faulty memory, so much as it’s a sign of a well-functioning brain that actively fact-checks itself. Human memory is notoriously faulty and malleable; this theory holds that déjà vu occurs as our brains’ frontal regions evaluate our memories and flag an error.

Another explanation for déjà vu, with some experimental findings to back it up, is that our stored memories still influence our present perception even if we can’t consciously recall them. A 2012 study that immersed participants in different virtual reality scenes saw most report déjà vu when viewing a scene that appeared similar to a previous one — even if they could not directly recall the earlier scene or its similarity. They just found the new scene inexplicably familiar.

Other explanations for déjà vu are more speculative. One suggests that déjà vu occurs when a familiar object appears incongruously. Seeing known objects or people out of context or unexpectedly is when familiarity strikes us, not seeing them within the usual, expected context. For instance, seeing your building’s security guard at the gate wouldn’t feel familiar — it just is; but seeing him at a restaurant might bring feelings of familiarity, even if you can’t place him. In the moment of out-of-context perception, our brains process the familiarity of known things first, even if we don’t consciously recognize them, and that initial familiarity can color our perception of the whole otherwise-unfamiliar experience. But ultimately, the mechanisms behind the creeping been-here-done-this-before feeling are as mysterious as the sensation itself. But one thing scientists know for sure: déjà vu becomes more common when we are stressed and tired.

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Déjà vu — French for “already seen” — is a mental sensation of intense familiarity coupled with the awareness that the familiarity is mistaken. It’s a recognition we know is wrong, a memory we know doesn’t exist. This conflict between what we know and what we remember is why déjà vu feels so eerie — almost paranormal or out-of-body. This awareness is very common. Déjà vu is almost impossible to study — people are rarely hooked up to electrodes or undergoing internal scans when they experience it — so most information about the sensation comes from self-reports, which suggest at least two-thirds of people will experience this fleeting mental trickery at some point in their lives. People who travel often or who watch a lot of movies may be more prone to déjà vu than others who don’t. The sensation does not seem to occur before age 8-9 (or perhaps children younger than that don’t have the ability to describe it), and experiences of déjà vu become less common as we age.

But as for why we experience déjà vu at all — that’s less clear. Multiple theories attempt to explain it, with each being a potentially legitimate source of the sensation. Like a physical itch, the mental itch of déjà vu likely has many causes, experts say.

Probably the strongest theory, with some experimental backing, is that the false familiarity isn’t a sign of faulty memory, so much as it’s a sign of a well-functioning brain that actively fact-checks itself. Human memory is notoriously faulty and malleable; this theory holds that déjà vu occurs as our brains’ frontal regions evaluate our memories and flag an error.

Another explanation for déjà vu, with some experimental findings to back it up, is that our stored memories still influence our present perception even if we can’t consciously recall them. A 2012 study that immersed participants in different virtual reality scenes saw most report déjà vu when viewing a scene that appeared similar to a previous one — even if they could not directly recall the earlier scene or its similarity. They just found the new scene inexplicably familiar.

Other explanations for déjà vu are more speculative. One suggests that déjà vu occurs when a familiar object appears incongruously. Seeing known objects or people out of context or unexpectedly is when familiarity strikes us, not seeing them within the usual, expected context. For instance, seeing your building’s security guard at the gate wouldn’t feel familiar — it just is; but seeing him at a restaurant might bring feelings of familiarity, even if you can’t place him. In the moment of out-of-context perception, our brains process the familiarity of known things first, even if we don’t consciously recognize them, and that initial familiarity can color our perception of the whole otherwise-unfamiliar experience. But ultimately, the mechanisms behind the creeping been-here-done-this-before feeling are as mysterious as the sensation itself. But one thing scientists know for sure: déjà vu becomes more common when we are stressed and tired.

correct answer:- 4

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Déjà vu — French for “already seen” — is a mental sensation of intense familiarity coupled with the awareness that the familiarity is mistaken. It’s a recognition we know is wrong, a memory we know doesn’t exist. This conflict between what we know and what we remember is why déjà vu feels so eerie — almost paranormal or out-of-body. This awareness is very common. Déjà vu is almost impossible to study — people are rarely hooked up to electrodes or undergoing internal scans when they experience it — so most information about the sensation comes from self-reports, which suggest at least two-thirds of people will experience this fleeting mental trickery at some point in their lives. People who travel often or who watch a lot of movies may be more prone to déjà vu than others who don’t. The sensation does not seem to occur before age 8-9 (or perhaps children younger than that don’t have the ability to describe it), and experiences of déjà vu become less common as we age.

But as for why we experience déjà vu at all — that’s less clear. Multiple theories attempt to explain it, with each being a potentially legitimate source of the sensation. Like a physical itch, the mental itch of déjà vu likely has many causes, experts say.

Probably the strongest theory, with some experimental backing, is that the false familiarity isn’t a sign of faulty memory, so much as it’s a sign of a well-functioning brain that actively fact-checks itself. Human memory is notoriously faulty and malleable; this theory holds that déjà vu occurs as our brains’ frontal regions evaluate our memories and flag an error.

Another explanation for déjà vu, with some experimental findings to back it up, is that our stored memories still influence our present perception even if we can’t consciously recall them. A 2012 study that immersed participants in different virtual reality scenes saw most report déjà vu when viewing a scene that appeared similar to a previous one — even if they could not directly recall the earlier scene or its similarity. They just found the new scene inexplicably familiar.

Other explanations for déjà vu are more speculative. One suggests that déjà vu occurs when a familiar object appears incongruously. Seeing known objects or people out of context or unexpectedly is when familiarity strikes us, not seeing them within the usual, expected context. For instance, seeing your building’s security guard at the gate wouldn’t feel familiar — it just is; but seeing him at a restaurant might bring feelings of familiarity, even if you can’t place him. In the moment of out-of-context perception, our brains process the familiarity of known things first, even if we don’t consciously recognize them, and that initial familiarity can color our perception of the whole otherwise-unfamiliar experience. But ultimately, the mechanisms behind the creeping been-here-done-this-before feeling are as mysterious as the sensation itself. But one thing scientists know for sure: déjà vu becomes more common when we are stressed and tired.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Déjà vu — French for “already seen” — is a mental sensation of intense familiarity coupled with the awareness that the familiarity is mistaken. It’s a recognition we know is wrong, a memory we know doesn’t exist. This conflict between what we know and what we remember is why déjà vu feels so eerie — almost paranormal or out-of-body. This awareness is very common. Déjà vu is almost impossible to study — people are rarely hooked up to electrodes or undergoing internal scans when they experience it — so most information about the sensation comes from self-reports, which suggest at least two-thirds of people will experience this fleeting mental trickery at some point in their lives. People who travel often or who watch a lot of movies may be more prone to déjà vu than others who don’t. The sensation does not seem to occur before age 8-9 (or perhaps children younger than that don’t have the ability to describe it), and experiences of déjà vu become less common as we age.

But as for why we experience déjà vu at all — that’s less clear. Multiple theories attempt to explain it, with each being a potentially legitimate source of the sensation. Like a physical itch, the mental itch of déjà vu likely has many causes, experts say.

Probably the strongest theory, with some experimental backing, is that the false familiarity isn’t a sign of faulty memory, so much as it’s a sign of a well-functioning brain that actively fact-checks itself. Human memory is notoriously faulty and malleable; this theory holds that déjà vu occurs as our brains’ frontal regions evaluate our memories and flag an error.

Another explanation for déjà vu, with some experimental findings to back it up, is that our stored memories still influence our present perception even if we can’t consciously recall them. A 2012 study that immersed participants in different virtual reality scenes saw most report déjà vu when viewing a scene that appeared similar to a previous one — even if they could not directly recall the earlier scene or its similarity. They just found the new scene inexplicably familiar.

Other explanations for déjà vu are more speculative. One suggests that déjà vu occurs when a familiar object appears incongruously. Seeing known objects or people out of context or unexpectedly is when familiarity strikes us, not seeing them within the usual, expected context. For instance, seeing your building’s security guard at the gate wouldn’t feel familiar — it just is; but seeing him at a restaurant might bring feelings of familiarity, even if you can’t place him. In the moment of out-of-context perception, our brains process the familiarity of known things first, even if we don’t consciously recognize them, and that initial familiarity can color our perception of the whole otherwise-unfamiliar experience. But ultimately, the mechanisms behind the creeping been-here-done-this-before feeling are as mysterious as the sensation itself. But one thing scientists know for sure: déjà vu becomes more common when we are stressed and tired.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Déjà vu — French for “already seen” — is a mental sensation of intense familiarity coupled with the awareness that the familiarity is mistaken. It’s a recognition we know is wrong, a memory we know doesn’t exist. This conflict between what we know and what we remember is why déjà vu feels so eerie — almost paranormal or out-of-body. This awareness is very common. Déjà vu is almost impossible to study — people are rarely hooked up to electrodes or undergoing internal scans when they experience it — so most information about the sensation comes from self-reports, which suggest at least two-thirds of people will experience this fleeting mental trickery at some point in their lives. People who travel often or who watch a lot of movies may be more prone to déjà vu than others who don’t. The sensation does not seem to occur before age 8-9 (or perhaps children younger than that don’t have the ability to describe it), and experiences of déjà vu become less common as we age.

But as for why we experience déjà vu at all — that’s less clear. Multiple theories attempt to explain it, with each being a potentially legitimate source of the sensation. Like a physical itch, the mental itch of déjà vu likely has many causes, experts say.

Probably the strongest theory, with some experimental backing, is that the false familiarity isn’t a sign of faulty memory, so much as it’s a sign of a well-functioning brain that actively fact-checks itself. Human memory is notoriously faulty and malleable; this theory holds that déjà vu occurs as our brains’ frontal regions evaluate our memories and flag an error.

Another explanation for déjà vu, with some experimental findings to back it up, is that our stored memories still influence our present perception even if we can’t consciously recall them. A 2012 study that immersed participants in different virtual reality scenes saw most report déjà vu when viewing a scene that appeared similar to a previous one — even if they could not directly recall the earlier scene or its similarity. They just found the new scene inexplicably familiar.

Other explanations for déjà vu are more speculative. One suggests that déjà vu occurs when a familiar object appears incongruously. Seeing known objects or people out of context or unexpectedly is when familiarity strikes us, not seeing them within the usual, expected context. For instance, seeing your building’s security guard at the gate wouldn’t feel familiar — it just is; but seeing him at a restaurant might bring feelings of familiarity, even if you can’t place him. In the moment of out-of-context perception, our brains process the familiarity of known things first, even if we don’t consciously recognize them, and that initial familiarity can color our perception of the whole otherwise-unfamiliar experience. But ultimately, the mechanisms behind the creeping been-here-done-this-before feeling are as mysterious as the sensation itself. But one thing scientists know for sure: déjà vu becomes more common when we are stressed and tired.

correct answer:- 1

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

For traditional Darwinian natural selection to work, the entities in question must display some property or ability that can be inherited, and that results in their having more offspring than the competition. For instance, the first creatures with vision, however fuzzy, were presumably better at avoiding predators and finding mates than the sightless members of their population, and had more surviving progeny for that reason. In technical terms, then, selected entities must exist in populations showing heritable variation in fitness, greater fitness resulting in these entities’ differential reproduction.

Even if inherited properties are the result of undirected or ‘random’ mutation, repeating the selection process over generations will incrementally improve on them. This produces complex adaptations such as the vertebrate eye, with its highly sophisticated function. Lightsensitive areas acquired lenses for focusing and means for distinguishing colours step by advantageous step, ultimately producing modern eyes that are clearly for seeing. So even without an overall purpose, evolution, through selection,  creates something that behaves as if it has a goal.

Back in 1979, when Lovelock’s first popular book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, came out, the wider field of evolutionary biology was becoming a very reductionist discipline. Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene had been published three years earlier, and it promoted a hardcore gene-centrism insisting that we look at genes as the fundamental units of selection - that is, the thing upon which natural selection operates. His claim was that genes were the reproducing entities par excellence, because they are the only things that always replicate and produce enduring lineages. Replication here means making fairly exact one-to-one copies, as genes (and asexual organisms such as bacteria) do. Reproduction, though, is a more inclusive and forgiving term - it’s what we humans and other sexual species do, when we make offspring that resemble both parents, but each only imperfectly. Still, this sloppy process exhibits heritable variation in fitness, and so supports evolution by natural selection.

In recent decades, many theorists have come to understand that there can be reproducing or even replicating entities evolving by natural selection at several levels of the biological hierarchy - not just in the domains of replicating genes and bacteria, or even sexual creatures such as ourselves. They have come to embrace something called multilevel selection theory: the idea that life can be represented as a hierarchy of entities nested together in larger entities, like Russian dolls. As the philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith puts it, ‘genes, cells, social groups and species can all, in principle, enter into change of this kind’.

But to qualify as a thing on which natural selection can operate - a unit of selection - ‘they must be connected by parent-offspring relations; they must have the capacity to reproduce,’ Godfrey-Smith continues. It’s the requirement for reproduction and leaving parent-offspring lineages (lines of descent) we need to focus on here, because they remain essential in traditional formulations. Without reproduction, fitness is undefined, and heritability seems to make no sense. And without lines of descent, at some level, how can we even conceive of natural selection?

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

For traditional Darwinian natural selection to work, the entities in question must display some property or ability that can be inherited, and that results in their having more offspring than the competition. For instance, the first creatures with vision, however fuzzy, were presumably better at avoiding predators and finding mates than the sightless members of their population, and had more surviving progeny for that reason. In technical terms, then, selected entities must exist in populations showing heritable variation in fitness, greater fitness resulting in these entities’ differential reproduction.

Even if inherited properties are the result of undirected or ‘random’ mutation, repeating the selection process over generations will incrementally improve on them. This produces complex adaptations such as the vertebrate eye, with its highly sophisticated function. Lightsensitive areas acquired lenses for focusing and means for distinguishing colours step by advantageous step, ultimately producing modern eyes that are clearly for seeing. So even without an overall purpose, evolution, through selection,  creates something that behaves as if it has a goal.

Back in 1979, when Lovelock’s first popular book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, came out, the wider field of evolutionary biology was becoming a very reductionist discipline. Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene had been published three years earlier, and it promoted a hardcore gene-centrism insisting that we look at genes as the fundamental units of selection - that is, the thing upon which natural selection operates. His claim was that genes were the reproducing entities par excellence, because they are the only things that always replicate and produce enduring lineages. Replication here means making fairly exact one-to-one copies, as genes (and asexual organisms such as bacteria) do. Reproduction, though, is a more inclusive and forgiving term - it’s what we humans and other sexual species do, when we make offspring that resemble both parents, but each only imperfectly. Still, this sloppy process exhibits heritable variation in fitness, and so supports evolution by natural selection.

In recent decades, many theorists have come to understand that there can be reproducing or even replicating entities evolving by natural selection at several levels of the biological hierarchy - not just in the domains of replicating genes and bacteria, or even sexual creatures such as ourselves. They have come to embrace something called multilevel selection theory: the idea that life can be represented as a hierarchy of entities nested together in larger entities, like Russian dolls. As the philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith puts it, ‘genes, cells, social groups and species can all, in principle, enter into change of this kind’.

But to qualify as a thing on which natural selection can operate - a unit of selection - ‘they must be connected by parent-offspring relations; they must have the capacity to reproduce,’ Godfrey-Smith continues. It’s the requirement for reproduction and leaving parent-offspring lineages (lines of descent) we need to focus on here, because they remain essential in traditional formulations. Without reproduction, fitness is undefined, and heritability seems to make no sense. And without lines of descent, at some level, how can we even conceive of natural selection?

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

For traditional Darwinian natural selection to work, the entities in question must display some property or ability that can be inherited, and that results in their having more offspring than the competition. For instance, the first creatures with vision, however fuzzy, were presumably better at avoiding predators and finding mates than the sightless members of their population, and had more surviving progeny for that reason. In technical terms, then, selected entities must exist in populations showing heritable variation in fitness, greater fitness resulting in these entities’ differential reproduction.

Even if inherited properties are the result of undirected or ‘random’ mutation, repeating the selection process over generations will incrementally improve on them. This produces complex adaptations such as the vertebrate eye, with its highly sophisticated function. Lightsensitive areas acquired lenses for focusing and means for distinguishing colours step by advantageous step, ultimately producing modern eyes that are clearly for seeing. So even without an overall purpose, evolution, through selection,  creates something that behaves as if it has a goal.

Back in 1979, when Lovelock’s first popular book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, came out, the wider field of evolutionary biology was becoming a very reductionist discipline. Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene had been published three years earlier, and it promoted a hardcore gene-centrism insisting that we look at genes as the fundamental units of selection - that is, the thing upon which natural selection operates. His claim was that genes were the reproducing entities par excellence, because they are the only things that always replicate and produce enduring lineages. Replication here means making fairly exact one-to-one copies, as genes (and asexual organisms such as bacteria) do. Reproduction, though, is a more inclusive and forgiving term - it’s what we humans and other sexual species do, when we make offspring that resemble both parents, but each only imperfectly. Still, this sloppy process exhibits heritable variation in fitness, and so supports evolution by natural selection.

In recent decades, many theorists have come to understand that there can be reproducing or even replicating entities evolving by natural selection at several levels of the biological hierarchy - not just in the domains of replicating genes and bacteria, or even sexual creatures such as ourselves. They have come to embrace something called multilevel selection theory: the idea that life can be represented as a hierarchy of entities nested together in larger entities, like Russian dolls. As the philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith puts it, ‘genes, cells, social groups and species can all, in principle, enter into change of this kind’.

But to qualify as a thing on which natural selection can operate - a unit of selection - ‘they must be connected by parent-offspring relations; they must have the capacity to reproduce,’ Godfrey-Smith continues. It’s the requirement for reproduction and leaving parent-offspring lineages (lines of descent) we need to focus on here, because they remain essential in traditional formulations. Without reproduction, fitness is undefined, and heritability seems to make no sense. And without lines of descent, at some level, how can we even conceive of natural selection?

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

For traditional Darwinian natural selection to work, the entities in question must display some property or ability that can be inherited, and that results in their having more offspring than the competition. For instance, the first creatures with vision, however fuzzy, were presumably better at avoiding predators and finding mates than the sightless members of their population, and had more surviving progeny for that reason. In technical terms, then, selected entities must exist in populations showing heritable variation in fitness, greater fitness resulting in these entities’ differential reproduction.

Even if inherited properties are the result of undirected or ‘random’ mutation, repeating the selection process over generations will incrementally improve on them. This produces complex adaptations such as the vertebrate eye, with its highly sophisticated function. Lightsensitive areas acquired lenses for focusing and means for distinguishing colours step by advantageous step, ultimately producing modern eyes that are clearly for seeing. So even without an overall purpose, evolution, through selection,  creates something that behaves as if it has a goal.

Back in 1979, when Lovelock’s first popular book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, came out, the wider field of evolutionary biology was becoming a very reductionist discipline. Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene had been published three years earlier, and it promoted a hardcore gene-centrism insisting that we look at genes as the fundamental units of selection - that is, the thing upon which natural selection operates. His claim was that genes were the reproducing entities par excellence, because they are the only things that always replicate and produce enduring lineages. Replication here means making fairly exact one-to-one copies, as genes (and asexual organisms such as bacteria) do. Reproduction, though, is a more inclusive and forgiving term - it’s what we humans and other sexual species do, when we make offspring that resemble both parents, but each only imperfectly. Still, this sloppy process exhibits heritable variation in fitness, and so supports evolution by natural selection.

In recent decades, many theorists have come to understand that there can be reproducing or even replicating entities evolving by natural selection at several levels of the biological hierarchy - not just in the domains of replicating genes and bacteria, or even sexual creatures such as ourselves. They have come to embrace something called multilevel selection theory: the idea that life can be represented as a hierarchy of entities nested together in larger entities, like Russian dolls. As the philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith puts it, ‘genes, cells, social groups and species can all, in principle, enter into change of this kind’.

But to qualify as a thing on which natural selection can operate - a unit of selection - ‘they must be connected by parent-offspring relations; they must have the capacity to reproduce,’ Godfrey-Smith continues. It’s the requirement for reproduction and leaving parent-offspring lineages (lines of descent) we need to focus on here, because they remain essential in traditional formulations. Without reproduction, fitness is undefined, and heritability seems to make no sense. And without lines of descent, at some level, how can we even conceive of natural selection?

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

For traditional Darwinian natural selection to work, the entities in question must display some property or ability that can be inherited, and that results in their having more offspring than the competition. For instance, the first creatures with vision, however fuzzy, were presumably better at avoiding predators and finding mates than the sightless members of their population, and had more surviving progeny for that reason. In technical terms, then, selected entities must exist in populations showing heritable variation in fitness, greater fitness resulting in these entities’ differential reproduction.

Even if inherited properties are the result of undirected or ‘random’ mutation, repeating the selection process over generations will incrementally improve on them. This produces complex adaptations such as the vertebrate eye, with its highly sophisticated function. Lightsensitive areas acquired lenses for focusing and means for distinguishing colours step by advantageous step, ultimately producing modern eyes that are clearly for seeing. So even without an overall purpose, evolution, through selection,  creates something that behaves as if it has a goal.

Back in 1979, when Lovelock’s first popular book, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth, came out, the wider field of evolutionary biology was becoming a very reductionist discipline. Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene had been published three years earlier, and it promoted a hardcore gene-centrism insisting that we look at genes as the fundamental units of selection - that is, the thing upon which natural selection operates. His claim was that genes were the reproducing entities par excellence, because they are the only things that always replicate and produce enduring lineages. Replication here means making fairly exact one-to-one copies, as genes (and asexual organisms such as bacteria) do. Reproduction, though, is a more inclusive and forgiving term - it’s what we humans and other sexual species do, when we make offspring that resemble both parents, but each only imperfectly. Still, this sloppy process exhibits heritable variation in fitness, and so supports evolution by natural selection.

In recent decades, many theorists have come to understand that there can be reproducing or even replicating entities evolving by natural selection at several levels of the biological hierarchy - not just in the domains of replicating genes and bacteria, or even sexual creatures such as ourselves. They have come to embrace something called multilevel selection theory: the idea that life can be represented as a hierarchy of entities nested together in larger entities, like Russian dolls. As the philosopher of science Peter Godfrey-Smith puts it, ‘genes, cells, social groups and species can all, in principle, enter into change of this kind’.

But to qualify as a thing on which natural selection can operate - a unit of selection - ‘they must be connected by parent-offspring relations; they must have the capacity to reproduce,’ Godfrey-Smith continues. It’s the requirement for reproduction and leaving parent-offspring lineages (lines of descent) we need to focus on here, because they remain essential in traditional formulations. Without reproduction, fitness is undefined, and heritability seems to make no sense. And without lines of descent, at some level, how can we even conceive of natural selection?

correct answer:- 4

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correct answer:- 2431

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correct answer:- 1

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correct answer:- 2

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correct answer:- 1

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The history of sport is full of suffering. In 1973, the boxer Muhammad Ali fought with a broken jaw for at least four rounds during his first historic bout with Ken Norton. In 1993, the American footballer Emmitt Smith played the entire second half of an NFL game with a first-degree separated shoulder, his arm hanging limply at his side as he ran for a heroic 168 yards. And in 1997, the basketball player Michael Jordan was delirious with fever when he scored 38 points in Game 5 of the NBA Finals; after the final buzzer, Scottie Pippen had to carry Jordan off the court because he no longer seemed able to support his own body weight.

Why such a drive to suffer and endure? A study by the medical researcher Jonas Tesarz and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg in 2012 found that athletes had significantly higher pain tolerance than normally active people. And yet both groups had similar pain thresholds, the point at which a sensation is recognisable as pain. Training can’t make athletes numb to pain, but it can condition them to tolerate it. And that kind of self-overcoming seems somehow integral to sport itself. And of course, if you’re suffering, the chances are that your opponent is, too. Indifference to pain confers a tactical advantage.

‘I remember the best race I ever had where the pain was almost enjoyable because you see other people hurt more than you,’ one Olympic athlete admitted during a study of pain tolerance. ‘If nothing is going wrong and there are no mechanical problems during the race then sometimes you can just turn the volume up a little higher and then a little higher and other people suffer and you almost enjoy it, even though you are in pain.’

Japanese trainers have gone so far as to enshrine this marriage of pain and athletic discipline in the concept of taibatsu, which translates roughly as ‘corporal punishment’. In his piece on Japanese baseball for The Japan Times last year, Robert Whiting traces the concept to one Suishu Tobita, head coach of the fabled Waseda University team in the 1920s. Tobita advocated ‘a baseball of savage pain and a baseball practice of savage treatment’. Players nicknamed his practice sessions ‘death training’: ‘If the players do not try so hard as to vomit blood in practice,’ he said, ‘then they cannot hope to win games. One must suffer to be good.’ This ethos has survived into the present day.  The Japanese-born New York Yankees pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, has admitted that there were times in elementary school when his buttocks were beaten with a baseball bat until he couldn’t sit down.

In one sense, then, it appears that sport is largely about ignoring pain. And yet pain returns to assert itself in a strange and striking way when we look at the broader category of competitive play. In a way, pain is one of the first games we learn. We live in an inverse relation to it, claiming as ideal any form of civilisation in which the possibility of experiencing pain is minimised. It is the first and most fundamental rule we learn to follow through free will, something that roots our lives in an inescapable game-like quality. We are always ruled by pain, and those capable of breaking its hold for a few moments become our heroes, role models, and victors.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The history of sport is full of suffering. In 1973, the boxer Muhammad Ali fought with a broken jaw for at least four rounds during his first historic bout with Ken Norton. In 1993, the American footballer Emmitt Smith played the entire second half of an NFL game with a first-degree separated shoulder, his arm hanging limply at his side as he ran for a heroic 168 yards. And in 1997, the basketball player Michael Jordan was delirious with fever when he scored 38 points in Game 5 of the NBA Finals; after the final buzzer, Scottie Pippen had to carry Jordan off the court because he no longer seemed able to support his own body weight.

Why such a drive to suffer and endure? A study by the medical researcher Jonas Tesarz and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg in 2012 found that athletes had significantly higher pain tolerance than normally active people. And yet both groups had similar pain thresholds, the point at which a sensation is recognisable as pain. Training can’t make athletes numb to pain, but it can condition them to tolerate it. And that kind of self-overcoming seems somehow integral to sport itself. And of course, if you’re suffering, the chances are that your opponent is, too. Indifference to pain confers a tactical advantage.

‘I remember the best race I ever had where the pain was almost enjoyable because you see other people hurt more than you,’ one Olympic athlete admitted during a study of pain tolerance. ‘If nothing is going wrong and there are no mechanical problems during the race then sometimes you can just turn the volume up a little higher and then a little higher and other people suffer and you almost enjoy it, even though you are in pain.’

Japanese trainers have gone so far as to enshrine this marriage of pain and athletic discipline in the concept of taibatsu, which translates roughly as ‘corporal punishment’. In his piece on Japanese baseball for The Japan Times last year, Robert Whiting traces the concept to one Suishu Tobita, head coach of the fabled Waseda University team in the 1920s. Tobita advocated ‘a baseball of savage pain and a baseball practice of savage treatment’. Players nicknamed his practice sessions ‘death training’: ‘If the players do not try so hard as to vomit blood in practice,’ he said, ‘then they cannot hope to win games. One must suffer to be good.’ This ethos has survived into the present day.  The Japanese-born New York Yankees pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, has admitted that there were times in elementary school when his buttocks were beaten with a baseball bat until he couldn’t sit down.

In one sense, then, it appears that sport is largely about ignoring pain. And yet pain returns to assert itself in a strange and striking way when we look at the broader category of competitive play. In a way, pain is one of the first games we learn. We live in an inverse relation to it, claiming as ideal any form of civilisation in which the possibility of experiencing pain is minimised. It is the first and most fundamental rule we learn to follow through free will, something that roots our lives in an inescapable game-like quality. We are always ruled by pain, and those capable of breaking its hold for a few moments become our heroes, role models, and victors.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The history of sport is full of suffering. In 1973, the boxer Muhammad Ali fought with a broken jaw for at least four rounds during his first historic bout with Ken Norton. In 1993, the American footballer Emmitt Smith played the entire second half of an NFL game with a first-degree separated shoulder, his arm hanging limply at his side as he ran for a heroic 168 yards. And in 1997, the basketball player Michael Jordan was delirious with fever when he scored 38 points in Game 5 of the NBA Finals; after the final buzzer, Scottie Pippen had to carry Jordan off the court because he no longer seemed able to support his own body weight.

Why such a drive to suffer and endure? A study by the medical researcher Jonas Tesarz and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg in 2012 found that athletes had significantly higher pain tolerance than normally active people. And yet both groups had similar pain thresholds, the point at which a sensation is recognisable as pain. Training can’t make athletes numb to pain, but it can condition them to tolerate it. And that kind of self-overcoming seems somehow integral to sport itself. And of course, if you’re suffering, the chances are that your opponent is, too. Indifference to pain confers a tactical advantage.

‘I remember the best race I ever had where the pain was almost enjoyable because you see other people hurt more than you,’ one Olympic athlete admitted during a study of pain tolerance. ‘If nothing is going wrong and there are no mechanical problems during the race then sometimes you can just turn the volume up a little higher and then a little higher and other people suffer and you almost enjoy it, even though you are in pain.’

Japanese trainers have gone so far as to enshrine this marriage of pain and athletic discipline in the concept of taibatsu, which translates roughly as ‘corporal punishment’. In his piece on Japanese baseball for The Japan Times last year, Robert Whiting traces the concept to one Suishu Tobita, head coach of the fabled Waseda University team in the 1920s. Tobita advocated ‘a baseball of savage pain and a baseball practice of savage treatment’. Players nicknamed his practice sessions ‘death training’: ‘If the players do not try so hard as to vomit blood in practice,’ he said, ‘then they cannot hope to win games. One must suffer to be good.’ This ethos has survived into the present day.  The Japanese-born New York Yankees pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, has admitted that there were times in elementary school when his buttocks were beaten with a baseball bat until he couldn’t sit down.

In one sense, then, it appears that sport is largely about ignoring pain. And yet pain returns to assert itself in a strange and striking way when we look at the broader category of competitive play. In a way, pain is one of the first games we learn. We live in an inverse relation to it, claiming as ideal any form of civilisation in which the possibility of experiencing pain is minimised. It is the first and most fundamental rule we learn to follow through free will, something that roots our lives in an inescapable game-like quality. We are always ruled by pain, and those capable of breaking its hold for a few moments become our heroes, role models, and victors.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The history of sport is full of suffering. In 1973, the boxer Muhammad Ali fought with a broken jaw for at least four rounds during his first historic bout with Ken Norton. In 1993, the American footballer Emmitt Smith played the entire second half of an NFL game with a first-degree separated shoulder, his arm hanging limply at his side as he ran for a heroic 168 yards. And in 1997, the basketball player Michael Jordan was delirious with fever when he scored 38 points in Game 5 of the NBA Finals; after the final buzzer, Scottie Pippen had to carry Jordan off the court because he no longer seemed able to support his own body weight.

Why such a drive to suffer and endure? A study by the medical researcher Jonas Tesarz and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg in 2012 found that athletes had significantly higher pain tolerance than normally active people. And yet both groups had similar pain thresholds, the point at which a sensation is recognisable as pain. Training can’t make athletes numb to pain, but it can condition them to tolerate it. And that kind of self-overcoming seems somehow integral to sport itself. And of course, if you’re suffering, the chances are that your opponent is, too. Indifference to pain confers a tactical advantage.

‘I remember the best race I ever had where the pain was almost enjoyable because you see other people hurt more than you,’ one Olympic athlete admitted during a study of pain tolerance. ‘If nothing is going wrong and there are no mechanical problems during the race then sometimes you can just turn the volume up a little higher and then a little higher and other people suffer and you almost enjoy it, even though you are in pain.’

Japanese trainers have gone so far as to enshrine this marriage of pain and athletic discipline in the concept of taibatsu, which translates roughly as ‘corporal punishment’. In his piece on Japanese baseball for The Japan Times last year, Robert Whiting traces the concept to one Suishu Tobita, head coach of the fabled Waseda University team in the 1920s. Tobita advocated ‘a baseball of savage pain and a baseball practice of savage treatment’. Players nicknamed his practice sessions ‘death training’: ‘If the players do not try so hard as to vomit blood in practice,’ he said, ‘then they cannot hope to win games. One must suffer to be good.’ This ethos has survived into the present day.  The Japanese-born New York Yankees pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, has admitted that there were times in elementary school when his buttocks were beaten with a baseball bat until he couldn’t sit down.

In one sense, then, it appears that sport is largely about ignoring pain. And yet pain returns to assert itself in a strange and striking way when we look at the broader category of competitive play. In a way, pain is one of the first games we learn. We live in an inverse relation to it, claiming as ideal any form of civilisation in which the possibility of experiencing pain is minimised. It is the first and most fundamental rule we learn to follow through free will, something that roots our lives in an inescapable game-like quality. We are always ruled by pain, and those capable of breaking its hold for a few moments become our heroes, role models, and victors.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

The history of sport is full of suffering. In 1973, the boxer Muhammad Ali fought with a broken jaw for at least four rounds during his first historic bout with Ken Norton. In 1993, the American footballer Emmitt Smith played the entire second half of an NFL game with a first-degree separated shoulder, his arm hanging limply at his side as he ran for a heroic 168 yards. And in 1997, the basketball player Michael Jordan was delirious with fever when he scored 38 points in Game 5 of the NBA Finals; after the final buzzer, Scottie Pippen had to carry Jordan off the court because he no longer seemed able to support his own body weight.

Why such a drive to suffer and endure? A study by the medical researcher Jonas Tesarz and colleagues at the University of Heidelberg in 2012 found that athletes had significantly higher pain tolerance than normally active people. And yet both groups had similar pain thresholds, the point at which a sensation is recognisable as pain. Training can’t make athletes numb to pain, but it can condition them to tolerate it. And that kind of self-overcoming seems somehow integral to sport itself. And of course, if you’re suffering, the chances are that your opponent is, too. Indifference to pain confers a tactical advantage.

‘I remember the best race I ever had where the pain was almost enjoyable because you see other people hurt more than you,’ one Olympic athlete admitted during a study of pain tolerance. ‘If nothing is going wrong and there are no mechanical problems during the race then sometimes you can just turn the volume up a little higher and then a little higher and other people suffer and you almost enjoy it, even though you are in pain.’

Japanese trainers have gone so far as to enshrine this marriage of pain and athletic discipline in the concept of taibatsu, which translates roughly as ‘corporal punishment’. In his piece on Japanese baseball for The Japan Times last year, Robert Whiting traces the concept to one Suishu Tobita, head coach of the fabled Waseda University team in the 1920s. Tobita advocated ‘a baseball of savage pain and a baseball practice of savage treatment’. Players nicknamed his practice sessions ‘death training’: ‘If the players do not try so hard as to vomit blood in practice,’ he said, ‘then they cannot hope to win games. One must suffer to be good.’ This ethos has survived into the present day.  The Japanese-born New York Yankees pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, has admitted that there were times in elementary school when his buttocks were beaten with a baseball bat until he couldn’t sit down.

In one sense, then, it appears that sport is largely about ignoring pain. And yet pain returns to assert itself in a strange and striking way when we look at the broader category of competitive play. In a way, pain is one of the first games we learn. We live in an inverse relation to it, claiming as ideal any form of civilisation in which the possibility of experiencing pain is minimised. It is the first and most fundamental rule we learn to follow through free will, something that roots our lives in an inescapable game-like quality. We are always ruled by pain, and those capable of breaking its hold for a few moments become our heroes, role models, and victors.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Mythology remains important in Western culture. Take, for instance, the role model of the hero, of contemporary revolutionaries, martyrs and dictators. These ideal figures exemplify models of human achievement. Similarly, notions of salvation, progress and ethics are so constitutive of our notions of reality that they’re often communicated through the format of mythology. There’s a surfeit of cultural products that fulfil the function of myth whereby characters and stories give us the means to understand the world we live in. Through superhero comic books, to the obscure immanence of modern art, from visions of paradisiacal vacations, to computer games and the self-mythologising of social media production, we seek a higher ground beyond the banal and the profane. We’ve even replaced the effervescent experience of sacred rites...in our engagement with art, drugs, cinema, rock music and all-night dance parties. Lastly, individuals have developed their own ways to create self-narratives that include mythical transitions in pilgrimages or personal quests to their ancestral lands. Likewise, some seek inner spaces wherein faith and meaning can be transformed into experience.

To prepare for our exploration of contemporary mythology, we can look back at civilisations and consider the function of the stories they told. The story of the flood, for example, recurs in early urban societies, marking a crisis in human-divine relations and man’s experience of gradual self-reliance and separation from nature. Whereas during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE), faith developed in an environment of early trade economies, at which time we observe a concern with individual conscience, morality, compassion and a tendency to look within. According to Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth (2005), these Axial myths of interiority indicate that people felt they no longer shared the same nature as the gods, and that the supreme reality had become impossibly difficult to access. These myths were a response to the loss of previous notions of social order, cosmology and human good, and represented ways to portray these social transformations in macrocosmic stories, and were reflections of how people tried to make sense of their rapidly changing world.

What constitutes a mythology? It’s an organised canon of beliefs that explains the state of the world. It also delivers an origin story - such as the Hindu Laws of Manu or the Biblical creation story - that creates a setting for how we experience the world. In fact, for Eliade, all myths provided an explanation of the world by virtue of giving an account of where things came from. If all mythologies are origin stories in this sense, what are the origin stories suggested by psychology? Two original elements of human nature are explained in its lore: the story of personhood - that is, what it means to be an individual and have an identity - and, secondly, the story of our physical constitution in the brain.

Contemporary psychology is a form of mythology insofar as it is an attempt to succor our need to believe in stories that provide a sense of value and signification in the context of secular modernity. The ways in which psychology is used - for example in experiments or self-help literature or personality tests or brain scans - are means of providing rituals to enact the myths of personhood and materialism.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Mythology remains important in Western culture. Take, for instance, the role model of the hero, of contemporary revolutionaries, martyrs and dictators. These ideal figures exemplify models of human achievement. Similarly, notions of salvation, progress and ethics are so constitutive of our notions of reality that they’re often communicated through the format of mythology. There’s a surfeit of cultural products that fulfil the function of myth whereby characters and stories give us the means to understand the world we live in. Through superhero comic books, to the obscure immanence of modern art, from visions of paradisiacal vacations, to computer games and the self-mythologising of social media production, we seek a higher ground beyond the banal and the profane. We’ve even replaced the effervescent experience of sacred rites...in our engagement with art, drugs, cinema, rock music and all-night dance parties. Lastly, individuals have developed their own ways to create self-narratives that include mythical transitions in pilgrimages or personal quests to their ancestral lands. Likewise, some seek inner spaces wherein faith and meaning can be transformed into experience.

To prepare for our exploration of contemporary mythology, we can look back at civilisations and consider the function of the stories they told. The story of the flood, for example, recurs in early urban societies, marking a crisis in human-divine relations and man’s experience of gradual self-reliance and separation from nature. Whereas during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE), faith developed in an environment of early trade economies, at which time we observe a concern with individual conscience, morality, compassion and a tendency to look within. According to Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth (2005), these Axial myths of interiority indicate that people felt they no longer shared the same nature as the gods, and that the supreme reality had become impossibly difficult to access. These myths were a response to the loss of previous notions of social order, cosmology and human good, and represented ways to portray these social transformations in macrocosmic stories, and were reflections of how people tried to make sense of their rapidly changing world.

What constitutes a mythology? It’s an organised canon of beliefs that explains the state of the world. It also delivers an origin story - such as the Hindu Laws of Manu or the Biblical creation story - that creates a setting for how we experience the world. In fact, for Eliade, all myths provided an explanation of the world by virtue of giving an account of where things came from. If all mythologies are origin stories in this sense, what are the origin stories suggested by psychology? Two original elements of human nature are explained in its lore: the story of personhood - that is, what it means to be an individual and have an identity - and, secondly, the story of our physical constitution in the brain.

Contemporary psychology is a form of mythology insofar as it is an attempt to succor our need to believe in stories that provide a sense of value and signification in the context of secular modernity. The ways in which psychology is used - for example in experiments or self-help literature or personality tests or brain scans - are means of providing rituals to enact the myths of personhood and materialism.

correct answer:- 4

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Mythology remains important in Western culture. Take, for instance, the role model of the hero, of contemporary revolutionaries, martyrs and dictators. These ideal figures exemplify models of human achievement. Similarly, notions of salvation, progress and ethics are so constitutive of our notions of reality that they’re often communicated through the format of mythology. There’s a surfeit of cultural products that fulfil the function of myth whereby characters and stories give us the means to understand the world we live in. Through superhero comic books, to the obscure immanence of modern art, from visions of paradisiacal vacations, to computer games and the self-mythologising of social media production, we seek a higher ground beyond the banal and the profane. We’ve even replaced the effervescent experience of sacred rites...in our engagement with art, drugs, cinema, rock music and all-night dance parties. Lastly, individuals have developed their own ways to create self-narratives that include mythical transitions in pilgrimages or personal quests to their ancestral lands. Likewise, some seek inner spaces wherein faith and meaning can be transformed into experience.

To prepare for our exploration of contemporary mythology, we can look back at civilisations and consider the function of the stories they told. The story of the flood, for example, recurs in early urban societies, marking a crisis in human-divine relations and man’s experience of gradual self-reliance and separation from nature. Whereas during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE), faith developed in an environment of early trade economies, at which time we observe a concern with individual conscience, morality, compassion and a tendency to look within. According to Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth (2005), these Axial myths of interiority indicate that people felt they no longer shared the same nature as the gods, and that the supreme reality had become impossibly difficult to access. These myths were a response to the loss of previous notions of social order, cosmology and human good, and represented ways to portray these social transformations in macrocosmic stories, and were reflections of how people tried to make sense of their rapidly changing world.

What constitutes a mythology? It’s an organised canon of beliefs that explains the state of the world. It also delivers an origin story - such as the Hindu Laws of Manu or the Biblical creation story - that creates a setting for how we experience the world. In fact, for Eliade, all myths provided an explanation of the world by virtue of giving an account of where things came from. If all mythologies are origin stories in this sense, what are the origin stories suggested by psychology? Two original elements of human nature are explained in its lore: the story of personhood - that is, what it means to be an individual and have an identity - and, secondly, the story of our physical constitution in the brain.

Contemporary psychology is a form of mythology insofar as it is an attempt to succor our need to believe in stories that provide a sense of value and signification in the context of secular modernity. The ways in which psychology is used - for example in experiments or self-help literature or personality tests or brain scans - are means of providing rituals to enact the myths of personhood and materialism.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Mythology remains important in Western culture. Take, for instance, the role model of the hero, of contemporary revolutionaries, martyrs and dictators. These ideal figures exemplify models of human achievement. Similarly, notions of salvation, progress and ethics are so constitutive of our notions of reality that they’re often communicated through the format of mythology. There’s a surfeit of cultural products that fulfil the function of myth whereby characters and stories give us the means to understand the world we live in. Through superhero comic books, to the obscure immanence of modern art, from visions of paradisiacal vacations, to computer games and the self-mythologising of social media production, we seek a higher ground beyond the banal and the profane. We’ve even replaced the effervescent experience of sacred rites...in our engagement with art, drugs, cinema, rock music and all-night dance parties. Lastly, individuals have developed their own ways to create self-narratives that include mythical transitions in pilgrimages or personal quests to their ancestral lands. Likewise, some seek inner spaces wherein faith and meaning can be transformed into experience.

To prepare for our exploration of contemporary mythology, we can look back at civilisations and consider the function of the stories they told. The story of the flood, for example, recurs in early urban societies, marking a crisis in human-divine relations and man’s experience of gradual self-reliance and separation from nature. Whereas during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE), faith developed in an environment of early trade economies, at which time we observe a concern with individual conscience, morality, compassion and a tendency to look within. According to Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth (2005), these Axial myths of interiority indicate that people felt they no longer shared the same nature as the gods, and that the supreme reality had become impossibly difficult to access. These myths were a response to the loss of previous notions of social order, cosmology and human good, and represented ways to portray these social transformations in macrocosmic stories, and were reflections of how people tried to make sense of their rapidly changing world.

What constitutes a mythology? It’s an organised canon of beliefs that explains the state of the world. It also delivers an origin story - such as the Hindu Laws of Manu or the Biblical creation story - that creates a setting for how we experience the world. In fact, for Eliade, all myths provided an explanation of the world by virtue of giving an account of where things came from. If all mythologies are origin stories in this sense, what are the origin stories suggested by psychology? Two original elements of human nature are explained in its lore: the story of personhood - that is, what it means to be an individual and have an identity - and, secondly, the story of our physical constitution in the brain.

Contemporary psychology is a form of mythology insofar as it is an attempt to succor our need to believe in stories that provide a sense of value and signification in the context of secular modernity. The ways in which psychology is used - for example in experiments or self-help literature or personality tests or brain scans - are means of providing rituals to enact the myths of personhood and materialism.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Mythology remains important in Western culture. Take, for instance, the role model of the hero, of contemporary revolutionaries, martyrs and dictators. These ideal figures exemplify models of human achievement. Similarly, notions of salvation, progress and ethics are so constitutive of our notions of reality that they’re often communicated through the format of mythology. There’s a surfeit of cultural products that fulfil the function of myth whereby characters and stories give us the means to understand the world we live in. Through superhero comic books, to the obscure immanence of modern art, from visions of paradisiacal vacations, to computer games and the self-mythologising of social media production, we seek a higher ground beyond the banal and the profane. We’ve even replaced the effervescent experience of sacred rites...in our engagement with art, drugs, cinema, rock music and all-night dance parties. Lastly, individuals have developed their own ways to create self-narratives that include mythical transitions in pilgrimages or personal quests to their ancestral lands. Likewise, some seek inner spaces wherein faith and meaning can be transformed into experience.

To prepare for our exploration of contemporary mythology, we can look back at civilisations and consider the function of the stories they told. The story of the flood, for example, recurs in early urban societies, marking a crisis in human-divine relations and man’s experience of gradual self-reliance and separation from nature. Whereas during the Axial Age (800-200 BCE), faith developed in an environment of early trade economies, at which time we observe a concern with individual conscience, morality, compassion and a tendency to look within. According to Karen Armstrong’s A Short History of Myth (2005), these Axial myths of interiority indicate that people felt they no longer shared the same nature as the gods, and that the supreme reality had become impossibly difficult to access. These myths were a response to the loss of previous notions of social order, cosmology and human good, and represented ways to portray these social transformations in macrocosmic stories, and were reflections of how people tried to make sense of their rapidly changing world.

What constitutes a mythology? It’s an organised canon of beliefs that explains the state of the world. It also delivers an origin story - such as the Hindu Laws of Manu or the Biblical creation story - that creates a setting for how we experience the world. In fact, for Eliade, all myths provided an explanation of the world by virtue of giving an account of where things came from. If all mythologies are origin stories in this sense, what are the origin stories suggested by psychology? Two original elements of human nature are explained in its lore: the story of personhood - that is, what it means to be an individual and have an identity - and, secondly, the story of our physical constitution in the brain.

Contemporary psychology is a form of mythology insofar as it is an attempt to succor our need to believe in stories that provide a sense of value and signification in the context of secular modernity. The ways in which psychology is used - for example in experiments or self-help literature or personality tests or brain scans - are means of providing rituals to enact the myths of personhood and materialism.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow:

Jesus said the truth will set us free. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power. Yet to recognise something as true is to be influenced by evidence or affected by the world - and in many ways knowledge limits our freedom. Climate change science calls us to alter our way of life and make sacrifices in order to avoid disaster. The urge to reject this science is strong: people try to find weak points in theories and look away from empirical evidence to maintain their freedom to eat meat or drive to work. Of course, critical scrutiny is crucial in science and an intrinsic part of scientific progress. The pursuit of knowledge goes hand in hand with doubt. The more intent a person is on obtaining knowledge, the less likely she is to have firm beliefs. That is why philosophy - the love of truth - often makes us more sceptical rather than knowledgeable. Socrates liked to say that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing.

This doesn’t mean that all doubt is sound or that all scepticism is motivated by a love of knowledge. There is a form of scepticism which cannot be taken as a scientific or otherwise theoretical attitude at all. So although climate science denial presents itself as a kind of doubt, based on an alternative interpretation of evidence, much of it should be understood as a practical attitude. It is not interested in knowledge to begin with. Instead, it seeks freedom from knowledge.

That is how the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard understood Socrates’s self-proclaimed ignorance: it was a rebellion against knowledge and an assertion of himself against objective reality. Kierkegaard called this attitude “irony” and he distinguished it carefully from doubt. Doubt is something we suffer insofar as we are invested in the truth but find it hard to verify our beliefs. The doubter feels alienated from reality and wants to get back in touch with it. The ironist, on the other hand, triumphs in this alienation. He does not love the truth; he loves the freedom that comes from not believing.

This notion of irony as a practical attitude different from doubt can be applied to a lot of climate science scepticism, such as cherry-picking a few dozen failed scientific predictions in order to reject all ecological science. Of course, irony manifests itself in a great deal of political thought, which has a thorny relation to facts, nature and culture. We see it at work when advocates of free immigration assert that national borders are purely imaginary and then infer from this that it is illegitimate to deny anyone entry into a territory.

Consider too the fierce resistance of some feminists to research in evolutionary biology that finds an innate basis for psychological and behavioural differences between the sexes. Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, for example, casts doubt on all of science by way of discrediting such findings. The discipline of biology, she points out, has a history of “encoding and justifying bias” by purporting to prove that women and non-Europeans are intellectually inferior to white men. But on the issue of gender differences, Prescod-Weinstein is, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, happy to trade knowledge for freedom.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow:

Jesus said the truth will set us free. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power. Yet to recognise something as true is to be influenced by evidence or affected by the world - and in many ways knowledge limits our freedom. Climate change science calls us to alter our way of life and make sacrifices in order to avoid disaster. The urge to reject this science is strong: people try to find weak points in theories and look away from empirical evidence to maintain their freedom to eat meat or drive to work. Of course, critical scrutiny is crucial in science and an intrinsic part of scientific progress. The pursuit of knowledge goes hand in hand with doubt. The more intent a person is on obtaining knowledge, the less likely she is to have firm beliefs. That is why philosophy - the love of truth - often makes us more sceptical rather than knowledgeable. Socrates liked to say that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing.

This doesn’t mean that all doubt is sound or that all scepticism is motivated by a love of knowledge. There is a form of scepticism which cannot be taken as a scientific or otherwise theoretical attitude at all. So although climate science denial presents itself as a kind of doubt, based on an alternative interpretation of evidence, much of it should be understood as a practical attitude. It is not interested in knowledge to begin with. Instead, it seeks freedom from knowledge.

That is how the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard understood Socrates’s self-proclaimed ignorance: it was a rebellion against knowledge and an assertion of himself against objective reality. Kierkegaard called this attitude “irony” and he distinguished it carefully from doubt. Doubt is something we suffer insofar as we are invested in the truth but find it hard to verify our beliefs. The doubter feels alienated from reality and wants to get back in touch with it. The ironist, on the other hand, triumphs in this alienation. He does not love the truth; he loves the freedom that comes from not believing.

This notion of irony as a practical attitude different from doubt can be applied to a lot of climate science scepticism, such as cherry-picking a few dozen failed scientific predictions in order to reject all ecological science. Of course, irony manifests itself in a great deal of political thought, which has a thorny relation to facts, nature and culture. We see it at work when advocates of free immigration assert that national borders are purely imaginary and then infer from this that it is illegitimate to deny anyone entry into a territory.

Consider too the fierce resistance of some feminists to research in evolutionary biology that finds an innate basis for psychological and behavioural differences between the sexes. Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, for example, casts doubt on all of science by way of discrediting such findings. The discipline of biology, she points out, has a history of “encoding and justifying bias” by purporting to prove that women and non-Europeans are intellectually inferior to white men. But on the issue of gender differences, Prescod-Weinstein is, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, happy to trade knowledge for freedom.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow:

Jesus said the truth will set us free. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power. Yet to recognise something as true is to be influenced by evidence or affected by the world - and in many ways knowledge limits our freedom. Climate change science calls us to alter our way of life and make sacrifices in order to avoid disaster. The urge to reject this science is strong: people try to find weak points in theories and look away from empirical evidence to maintain their freedom to eat meat or drive to work. Of course, critical scrutiny is crucial in science and an intrinsic part of scientific progress. The pursuit of knowledge goes hand in hand with doubt. The more intent a person is on obtaining knowledge, the less likely she is to have firm beliefs. That is why philosophy - the love of truth - often makes us more sceptical rather than knowledgeable. Socrates liked to say that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing.

This doesn’t mean that all doubt is sound or that all scepticism is motivated by a love of knowledge. There is a form of scepticism which cannot be taken as a scientific or otherwise theoretical attitude at all. So although climate science denial presents itself as a kind of doubt, based on an alternative interpretation of evidence, much of it should be understood as a practical attitude. It is not interested in knowledge to begin with. Instead, it seeks freedom from knowledge.

That is how the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard understood Socrates’s self-proclaimed ignorance: it was a rebellion against knowledge and an assertion of himself against objective reality. Kierkegaard called this attitude “irony” and he distinguished it carefully from doubt. Doubt is something we suffer insofar as we are invested in the truth but find it hard to verify our beliefs. The doubter feels alienated from reality and wants to get back in touch with it. The ironist, on the other hand, triumphs in this alienation. He does not love the truth; he loves the freedom that comes from not believing.

This notion of irony as a practical attitude different from doubt can be applied to a lot of climate science scepticism, such as cherry-picking a few dozen failed scientific predictions in order to reject all ecological science. Of course, irony manifests itself in a great deal of political thought, which has a thorny relation to facts, nature and culture. We see it at work when advocates of free immigration assert that national borders are purely imaginary and then infer from this that it is illegitimate to deny anyone entry into a territory.

Consider too the fierce resistance of some feminists to research in evolutionary biology that finds an innate basis for psychological and behavioural differences between the sexes. Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, for example, casts doubt on all of science by way of discrediting such findings. The discipline of biology, she points out, has a history of “encoding and justifying bias” by purporting to prove that women and non-Europeans are intellectually inferior to white men. But on the issue of gender differences, Prescod-Weinstein is, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, happy to trade knowledge for freedom.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow:

Jesus said the truth will set us free. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power. Yet to recognise something as true is to be influenced by evidence or affected by the world - and in many ways knowledge limits our freedom. Climate change science calls us to alter our way of life and make sacrifices in order to avoid disaster. The urge to reject this science is strong: people try to find weak points in theories and look away from empirical evidence to maintain their freedom to eat meat or drive to work. Of course, critical scrutiny is crucial in science and an intrinsic part of scientific progress. The pursuit of knowledge goes hand in hand with doubt. The more intent a person is on obtaining knowledge, the less likely she is to have firm beliefs. That is why philosophy - the love of truth - often makes us more sceptical rather than knowledgeable. Socrates liked to say that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing.

This doesn’t mean that all doubt is sound or that all scepticism is motivated by a love of knowledge. There is a form of scepticism which cannot be taken as a scientific or otherwise theoretical attitude at all. So although climate science denial presents itself as a kind of doubt, based on an alternative interpretation of evidence, much of it should be understood as a practical attitude. It is not interested in knowledge to begin with. Instead, it seeks freedom from knowledge.

That is how the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard understood Socrates’s self-proclaimed ignorance: it was a rebellion against knowledge and an assertion of himself against objective reality. Kierkegaard called this attitude “irony” and he distinguished it carefully from doubt. Doubt is something we suffer insofar as we are invested in the truth but find it hard to verify our beliefs. The doubter feels alienated from reality and wants to get back in touch with it. The ironist, on the other hand, triumphs in this alienation. He does not love the truth; he loves the freedom that comes from not believing.

This notion of irony as a practical attitude different from doubt can be applied to a lot of climate science scepticism, such as cherry-picking a few dozen failed scientific predictions in order to reject all ecological science. Of course, irony manifests itself in a great deal of political thought, which has a thorny relation to facts, nature and culture. We see it at work when advocates of free immigration assert that national borders are purely imaginary and then infer from this that it is illegitimate to deny anyone entry into a territory.

Consider too the fierce resistance of some feminists to research in evolutionary biology that finds an innate basis for psychological and behavioural differences between the sexes. Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, for example, casts doubt on all of science by way of discrediting such findings. The discipline of biology, she points out, has a history of “encoding and justifying bias” by purporting to prove that women and non-Europeans are intellectually inferior to white men. But on the issue of gender differences, Prescod-Weinstein is, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, happy to trade knowledge for freedom.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the questions that follow:

Jesus said the truth will set us free. Francis Bacon said knowledge is power. Yet to recognise something as true is to be influenced by evidence or affected by the world - and in many ways knowledge limits our freedom. Climate change science calls us to alter our way of life and make sacrifices in order to avoid disaster. The urge to reject this science is strong: people try to find weak points in theories and look away from empirical evidence to maintain their freedom to eat meat or drive to work. Of course, critical scrutiny is crucial in science and an intrinsic part of scientific progress. The pursuit of knowledge goes hand in hand with doubt. The more intent a person is on obtaining knowledge, the less likely she is to have firm beliefs. That is why philosophy - the love of truth - often makes us more sceptical rather than knowledgeable. Socrates liked to say that he knew nothing except the fact that he knew nothing.

This doesn’t mean that all doubt is sound or that all scepticism is motivated by a love of knowledge. There is a form of scepticism which cannot be taken as a scientific or otherwise theoretical attitude at all. So although climate science denial presents itself as a kind of doubt, based on an alternative interpretation of evidence, much of it should be understood as a practical attitude. It is not interested in knowledge to begin with. Instead, it seeks freedom from knowledge.

That is how the 19th-century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard understood Socrates’s self-proclaimed ignorance: it was a rebellion against knowledge and an assertion of himself against objective reality. Kierkegaard called this attitude “irony” and he distinguished it carefully from doubt. Doubt is something we suffer insofar as we are invested in the truth but find it hard to verify our beliefs. The doubter feels alienated from reality and wants to get back in touch with it. The ironist, on the other hand, triumphs in this alienation. He does not love the truth; he loves the freedom that comes from not believing.

This notion of irony as a practical attitude different from doubt can be applied to a lot of climate science scepticism, such as cherry-picking a few dozen failed scientific predictions in order to reject all ecological science. Of course, irony manifests itself in a great deal of political thought, which has a thorny relation to facts, nature and culture. We see it at work when advocates of free immigration assert that national borders are purely imaginary and then infer from this that it is illegitimate to deny anyone entry into a territory.

Consider too the fierce resistance of some feminists to research in evolutionary biology that finds an innate basis for psychological and behavioural differences between the sexes. Chanda Prescod-Weinstein, for example, casts doubt on all of science by way of discrediting such findings. The discipline of biology, she points out, has a history of “encoding and justifying bias” by purporting to prove that women and non-Europeans are intellectually inferior to white men. But on the issue of gender differences, Prescod-Weinstein is, like Kierkegaard’s Socrates, happy to trade knowledge for freedom.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

When investigating witchcraft, one needs to differentiate between real and imaginary magic in the early modern period. If we want to understand the connection between the imaginary magic of the witches and economic behaviour, we need to deal with the connection between the economy and the real magic practised by ‘common’ people. In pre-industrial Europe, magic was a part of everyday life, very much like religion. People didn’t just believe in the efficacy of magic, they actively tried to use magic themselves. Simple forms of divination and healing magic were common, as was magic related to agriculture. The peasant household used divination to find out if the time was right for certain agricultural activities. Charms were supposed to keep the livestock in good health. Urban artisans and merchants also used economic magic to increase their wealth.

Of all the forms of magic, magical treasure-hunting had the greatest economic significance. Treasure hunters drew on a vast magical arsenal. They had spell books of any description, divining rods available in any kind of wood, amulets to protect them against evil spirits, and lead tablets etched with magical signs.  To the utter horror of the ecclesiastical authorities, they invoked angels and saints. Treasure hunters talked to ghosts. Some of them even tried to conjure up demons. However,  common people simply didn’t see treasure magic as witchcraft, and most of the judges agreed.

Separate from these real forms of magic, there was the imaginary magic of the witches. Nobody was ever (or could ever be) guilty of witchcraft in the full sense of the word, which was defined by the late Middle Ages as a crime that consisted of five elements: a pact with the devil; sexual intercourse with demons; the magical flight (on a broomstick or a similar device); the witches’ dance (often referred to by the antisemitic term ‘witches’ sabbath’); and malevolent magic. Early modern Europe and Britain treated witchcraft as a capital crime.

At first glance, the relation between the economy and the imaginary magic of the witches seems to be entirely negative. Witches were often accused of attacking livestock. They magically made frost, storm and hail, and thereby caused crop failure. Indeed, their weather magic was said to endanger the economy of entire regions. Still, at least in the majority of the witch trials on the European continent, the witches didn’t profit from their magic. Weather magic especially looked like a strange form of auto-aggression because the hailstorms the witches supposedly conjured up damaged their own fields as well. As a rule, the pact with the devil as it appears in trial records was not a contract like that of Goethe’s Faust, which was mostly about the wishes of the magician. Rather, it stated simply that the witch submitted to the will of the demon. She did what a demon told her and became the instrument of the demon’s abyssal hatred of all creation. Witchcraft was mostly about destruction for destruction’s sake, not about the personal interests and wishes of the witches, let alone their economic advantage.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

When investigating witchcraft, one needs to differentiate between real and imaginary magic in the early modern period. If we want to understand the connection between the imaginary magic of the witches and economic behaviour, we need to deal with the connection between the economy and the real magic practised by ‘common’ people. In pre-industrial Europe, magic was a part of everyday life, very much like religion. People didn’t just believe in the efficacy of magic, they actively tried to use magic themselves. Simple forms of divination and healing magic were common, as was magic related to agriculture. The peasant household used divination to find out if the time was right for certain agricultural activities. Charms were supposed to keep the livestock in good health. Urban artisans and merchants also used economic magic to increase their wealth.

Of all the forms of magic, magical treasure-hunting had the greatest economic significance. Treasure hunters drew on a vast magical arsenal. They had spell books of any description, divining rods available in any kind of wood, amulets to protect them against evil spirits, and lead tablets etched with magical signs.  To the utter horror of the ecclesiastical authorities, they invoked angels and saints. Treasure hunters talked to ghosts. Some of them even tried to conjure up demons. However,  common people simply didn’t see treasure magic as witchcraft, and most of the judges agreed.

Separate from these real forms of magic, there was the imaginary magic of the witches. Nobody was ever (or could ever be) guilty of witchcraft in the full sense of the word, which was defined by the late Middle Ages as a crime that consisted of five elements: a pact with the devil; sexual intercourse with demons; the magical flight (on a broomstick or a similar device); the witches’ dance (often referred to by the antisemitic term ‘witches’ sabbath’); and malevolent magic. Early modern Europe and Britain treated witchcraft as a capital crime.

At first glance, the relation between the economy and the imaginary magic of the witches seems to be entirely negative. Witches were often accused of attacking livestock. They magically made frost, storm and hail, and thereby caused crop failure. Indeed, their weather magic was said to endanger the economy of entire regions. Still, at least in the majority of the witch trials on the European continent, the witches didn’t profit from their magic. Weather magic especially looked like a strange form of auto-aggression because the hailstorms the witches supposedly conjured up damaged their own fields as well. As a rule, the pact with the devil as it appears in trial records was not a contract like that of Goethe’s Faust, which was mostly about the wishes of the magician. Rather, it stated simply that the witch submitted to the will of the demon. She did what a demon told her and became the instrument of the demon’s abyssal hatred of all creation. Witchcraft was mostly about destruction for destruction’s sake, not about the personal interests and wishes of the witches, let alone their economic advantage.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

When investigating witchcraft, one needs to differentiate between real and imaginary magic in the early modern period. If we want to understand the connection between the imaginary magic of the witches and economic behaviour, we need to deal with the connection between the economy and the real magic practised by ‘common’ people. In pre-industrial Europe, magic was a part of everyday life, very much like religion. People didn’t just believe in the efficacy of magic, they actively tried to use magic themselves. Simple forms of divination and healing magic were common, as was magic related to agriculture. The peasant household used divination to find out if the time was right for certain agricultural activities. Charms were supposed to keep the livestock in good health. Urban artisans and merchants also used economic magic to increase their wealth.

Of all the forms of magic, magical treasure-hunting had the greatest economic significance. Treasure hunters drew on a vast magical arsenal. They had spell books of any description, divining rods available in any kind of wood, amulets to protect them against evil spirits, and lead tablets etched with magical signs.  To the utter horror of the ecclesiastical authorities, they invoked angels and saints. Treasure hunters talked to ghosts. Some of them even tried to conjure up demons. However,  common people simply didn’t see treasure magic as witchcraft, and most of the judges agreed.

Separate from these real forms of magic, there was the imaginary magic of the witches. Nobody was ever (or could ever be) guilty of witchcraft in the full sense of the word, which was defined by the late Middle Ages as a crime that consisted of five elements: a pact with the devil; sexual intercourse with demons; the magical flight (on a broomstick or a similar device); the witches’ dance (often referred to by the antisemitic term ‘witches’ sabbath’); and malevolent magic. Early modern Europe and Britain treated witchcraft as a capital crime.

At first glance, the relation between the economy and the imaginary magic of the witches seems to be entirely negative. Witches were often accused of attacking livestock. They magically made frost, storm and hail, and thereby caused crop failure. Indeed, their weather magic was said to endanger the economy of entire regions. Still, at least in the majority of the witch trials on the European continent, the witches didn’t profit from their magic. Weather magic especially looked like a strange form of auto-aggression because the hailstorms the witches supposedly conjured up damaged their own fields as well. As a rule, the pact with the devil as it appears in trial records was not a contract like that of Goethe’s Faust, which was mostly about the wishes of the magician. Rather, it stated simply that the witch submitted to the will of the demon. She did what a demon told her and became the instrument of the demon’s abyssal hatred of all creation. Witchcraft was mostly about destruction for destruction’s sake, not about the personal interests and wishes of the witches, let alone their economic advantage.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

When investigating witchcraft, one needs to differentiate between real and imaginary magic in the early modern period. If we want to understand the connection between the imaginary magic of the witches and economic behaviour, we need to deal with the connection between the economy and the real magic practised by ‘common’ people. In pre-industrial Europe, magic was a part of everyday life, very much like religion. People didn’t just believe in the efficacy of magic, they actively tried to use magic themselves. Simple forms of divination and healing magic were common, as was magic related to agriculture. The peasant household used divination to find out if the time was right for certain agricultural activities. Charms were supposed to keep the livestock in good health. Urban artisans and merchants also used economic magic to increase their wealth.

Of all the forms of magic, magical treasure-hunting had the greatest economic significance. Treasure hunters drew on a vast magical arsenal. They had spell books of any description, divining rods available in any kind of wood, amulets to protect them against evil spirits, and lead tablets etched with magical signs.  To the utter horror of the ecclesiastical authorities, they invoked angels and saints. Treasure hunters talked to ghosts. Some of them even tried to conjure up demons. However,  common people simply didn’t see treasure magic as witchcraft, and most of the judges agreed.

Separate from these real forms of magic, there was the imaginary magic of the witches. Nobody was ever (or could ever be) guilty of witchcraft in the full sense of the word, which was defined by the late Middle Ages as a crime that consisted of five elements: a pact with the devil; sexual intercourse with demons; the magical flight (on a broomstick or a similar device); the witches’ dance (often referred to by the antisemitic term ‘witches’ sabbath’); and malevolent magic. Early modern Europe and Britain treated witchcraft as a capital crime.

At first glance, the relation between the economy and the imaginary magic of the witches seems to be entirely negative. Witches were often accused of attacking livestock. They magically made frost, storm and hail, and thereby caused crop failure. Indeed, their weather magic was said to endanger the economy of entire regions. Still, at least in the majority of the witch trials on the European continent, the witches didn’t profit from their magic. Weather magic especially looked like a strange form of auto-aggression because the hailstorms the witches supposedly conjured up damaged their own fields as well. As a rule, the pact with the devil as it appears in trial records was not a contract like that of Goethe’s Faust, which was mostly about the wishes of the magician. Rather, it stated simply that the witch submitted to the will of the demon. She did what a demon told her and became the instrument of the demon’s abyssal hatred of all creation. Witchcraft was mostly about destruction for destruction’s sake, not about the personal interests and wishes of the witches, let alone their economic advantage.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

When investigating witchcraft, one needs to differentiate between real and imaginary magic in the early modern period. If we want to understand the connection between the imaginary magic of the witches and economic behaviour, we need to deal with the connection between the economy and the real magic practised by ‘common’ people. In pre-industrial Europe, magic was a part of everyday life, very much like religion. People didn’t just believe in the efficacy of magic, they actively tried to use magic themselves. Simple forms of divination and healing magic were common, as was magic related to agriculture. The peasant household used divination to find out if the time was right for certain agricultural activities. Charms were supposed to keep the livestock in good health. Urban artisans and merchants also used economic magic to increase their wealth.

Of all the forms of magic, magical treasure-hunting had the greatest economic significance. Treasure hunters drew on a vast magical arsenal. They had spell books of any description, divining rods available in any kind of wood, amulets to protect them against evil spirits, and lead tablets etched with magical signs.  To the utter horror of the ecclesiastical authorities, they invoked angels and saints. Treasure hunters talked to ghosts. Some of them even tried to conjure up demons. However,  common people simply didn’t see treasure magic as witchcraft, and most of the judges agreed.

Separate from these real forms of magic, there was the imaginary magic of the witches. Nobody was ever (or could ever be) guilty of witchcraft in the full sense of the word, which was defined by the late Middle Ages as a crime that consisted of five elements: a pact with the devil; sexual intercourse with demons; the magical flight (on a broomstick or a similar device); the witches’ dance (often referred to by the antisemitic term ‘witches’ sabbath’); and malevolent magic. Early modern Europe and Britain treated witchcraft as a capital crime.

At first glance, the relation between the economy and the imaginary magic of the witches seems to be entirely negative. Witches were often accused of attacking livestock. They magically made frost, storm and hail, and thereby caused crop failure. Indeed, their weather magic was said to endanger the economy of entire regions. Still, at least in the majority of the witch trials on the European continent, the witches didn’t profit from their magic. Weather magic especially looked like a strange form of auto-aggression because the hailstorms the witches supposedly conjured up damaged their own fields as well. As a rule, the pact with the devil as it appears in trial records was not a contract like that of Goethe’s Faust, which was mostly about the wishes of the magician. Rather, it stated simply that the witch submitted to the will of the demon. She did what a demon told her and became the instrument of the demon’s abyssal hatred of all creation. Witchcraft was mostly about destruction for destruction’s sake, not about the personal interests and wishes of the witches, let alone their economic advantage.

correct answer:- 4

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correct answer:- 4312

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correct answer:- 2

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correct answer:- 1

---

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Authenticity, which in its modern sense dates back to the Romantics of the late 18th century, has never had a single meaning. In much of our everyday usage, the term means something more or less analogous to the way that we speak of an object being authentic - as the genuine article, not a copy or a fake. We think of people as authentic when they’re being themselves, consistent with their own personality and without pretence or pretending.

But, as an ethical ideal...authenticity means more than self-consistency or a lack of pretentiousness. It also concerns features of the inner life that define us. While there is no one ‘essence’ of authenticity, the ideal has often been expressed as a commitment to being true to yourself, and ordering your soul and living your life so as to give faithful expression to your individuality, cherished projects and deepest convictions. Authenticity in this ethical sense also had a critical edge, standing against and challenging the utilitarian practices and conformist tendencies of the conventional social and economic order. Society erects barriers that the authentic person must break through. Finding your true self means self-reflection, engaging in candid self-appraisal and seeking ‘genuine self-knowledge’, in the words of the American philosopher Charles Guignon.

In his book The Society of Singularities (2017), the German social theorist Andreas Reckwitz argues that a larger ‘authenticity revolution’ has swept the world during the past 40 years. Authenticity has become an obligation. Reckwitz captures this conundrum with the paradoxical concept of ‘performative authenticity’. Authenticity, in this sense, is the way to be because to be ‘somebody’ is to develop your unique self, your differentness from others and your noninterchangeable life.

Performative authenticity is tied to economic success and social prestige, which means - and this is a further paradoxical feature - that your specialness and self-realisation have to be performed. In order for people to distinguish themselves, they must seek attention and visibility, and positively affect others with their self-representations, personal characteristics and quality of life. In doing so, they have to take great care that their performance isn’t perceived as staged.

Performative authenticity shares with older, inner conceptions of authenticity the notion that each of us has our own unique way of being in the world. But the concepts otherwise diverge. The inner ideal aims at a way of being that is unfeigned and without illusions. It resists the cultivation of an affirming audience, because being a ‘whole’ person, with a noninstrumental relation to self and others, is often at odds with the demands of society. In the performative mode, by contrast, this tension between self and society disappears. Self-elaboration still requires self-examination, but not necessarily of any inner or even aesthetic kind.

Performing your difference isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. Markets and digital technologies have greatly expanded the infrastructure of possibilities. It is, however, a competition for scarce attention that requires continuous assessment and feedback, and offers little respite. Even if you pull off a good performance, there’s a need to be flexible, to be ready to reinvent your difference. There’s always the danger of becoming inconspicuous.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Authenticity, which in its modern sense dates back to the Romantics of the late 18th century, has never had a single meaning. In much of our everyday usage, the term means something more or less analogous to the way that we speak of an object being authentic - as the genuine article, not a copy or a fake. We think of people as authentic when they’re being themselves, consistent with their own personality and without pretence or pretending.

But, as an ethical ideal...authenticity means more than self-consistency or a lack of pretentiousness. It also concerns features of the inner life that define us. While there is no one ‘essence’ of authenticity, the ideal has often been expressed as a commitment to being true to yourself, and ordering your soul and living your life so as to give faithful expression to your individuality, cherished projects and deepest convictions. Authenticity in this ethical sense also had a critical edge, standing against and challenging the utilitarian practices and conformist tendencies of the conventional social and economic order. Society erects barriers that the authentic person must break through. Finding your true self means self-reflection, engaging in candid self-appraisal and seeking ‘genuine self-knowledge’, in the words of the American philosopher Charles Guignon.

In his book The Society of Singularities (2017), the German social theorist Andreas Reckwitz argues that a larger ‘authenticity revolution’ has swept the world during the past 40 years. Authenticity has become an obligation. Reckwitz captures this conundrum with the paradoxical concept of ‘performative authenticity’. Authenticity, in this sense, is the way to be because to be ‘somebody’ is to develop your unique self, your differentness from others and your noninterchangeable life.

Performative authenticity is tied to economic success and social prestige, which means - and this is a further paradoxical feature - that your specialness and self-realisation have to be performed. In order for people to distinguish themselves, they must seek attention and visibility, and positively affect others with their self-representations, personal characteristics and quality of life. In doing so, they have to take great care that their performance isn’t perceived as staged.

Performative authenticity shares with older, inner conceptions of authenticity the notion that each of us has our own unique way of being in the world. But the concepts otherwise diverge. The inner ideal aims at a way of being that is unfeigned and without illusions. It resists the cultivation of an affirming audience, because being a ‘whole’ person, with a noninstrumental relation to self and others, is often at odds with the demands of society. In the performative mode, by contrast, this tension between self and society disappears. Self-elaboration still requires self-examination, but not necessarily of any inner or even aesthetic kind.

Performing your difference isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. Markets and digital technologies have greatly expanded the infrastructure of possibilities. It is, however, a competition for scarce attention that requires continuous assessment and feedback, and offers little respite. Even if you pull off a good performance, there’s a need to be flexible, to be ready to reinvent your difference. There’s always the danger of becoming inconspicuous.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Authenticity, which in its modern sense dates back to the Romantics of the late 18th century, has never had a single meaning. In much of our everyday usage, the term means something more or less analogous to the way that we speak of an object being authentic - as the genuine article, not a copy or a fake. We think of people as authentic when they’re being themselves, consistent with their own personality and without pretence or pretending.

But, as an ethical ideal...authenticity means more than self-consistency or a lack of pretentiousness. It also concerns features of the inner life that define us. While there is no one ‘essence’ of authenticity, the ideal has often been expressed as a commitment to being true to yourself, and ordering your soul and living your life so as to give faithful expression to your individuality, cherished projects and deepest convictions. Authenticity in this ethical sense also had a critical edge, standing against and challenging the utilitarian practices and conformist tendencies of the conventional social and economic order. Society erects barriers that the authentic person must break through. Finding your true self means self-reflection, engaging in candid self-appraisal and seeking ‘genuine self-knowledge’, in the words of the American philosopher Charles Guignon.

In his book The Society of Singularities (2017), the German social theorist Andreas Reckwitz argues that a larger ‘authenticity revolution’ has swept the world during the past 40 years. Authenticity has become an obligation. Reckwitz captures this conundrum with the paradoxical concept of ‘performative authenticity’. Authenticity, in this sense, is the way to be because to be ‘somebody’ is to develop your unique self, your differentness from others and your noninterchangeable life.

Performative authenticity is tied to economic success and social prestige, which means - and this is a further paradoxical feature - that your specialness and self-realisation have to be performed. In order for people to distinguish themselves, they must seek attention and visibility, and positively affect others with their self-representations, personal characteristics and quality of life. In doing so, they have to take great care that their performance isn’t perceived as staged.

Performative authenticity shares with older, inner conceptions of authenticity the notion that each of us has our own unique way of being in the world. But the concepts otherwise diverge. The inner ideal aims at a way of being that is unfeigned and without illusions. It resists the cultivation of an affirming audience, because being a ‘whole’ person, with a noninstrumental relation to self and others, is often at odds with the demands of society. In the performative mode, by contrast, this tension between self and society disappears. Self-elaboration still requires self-examination, but not necessarily of any inner or even aesthetic kind.

Performing your difference isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. Markets and digital technologies have greatly expanded the infrastructure of possibilities. It is, however, a competition for scarce attention that requires continuous assessment and feedback, and offers little respite. Even if you pull off a good performance, there’s a need to be flexible, to be ready to reinvent your difference. There’s always the danger of becoming inconspicuous.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Authenticity, which in its modern sense dates back to the Romantics of the late 18th century, has never had a single meaning. In much of our everyday usage, the term means something more or less analogous to the way that we speak of an object being authentic - as the genuine article, not a copy or a fake. We think of people as authentic when they’re being themselves, consistent with their own personality and without pretence or pretending.

But, as an ethical ideal...authenticity means more than self-consistency or a lack of pretentiousness. It also concerns features of the inner life that define us. While there is no one ‘essence’ of authenticity, the ideal has often been expressed as a commitment to being true to yourself, and ordering your soul and living your life so as to give faithful expression to your individuality, cherished projects and deepest convictions. Authenticity in this ethical sense also had a critical edge, standing against and challenging the utilitarian practices and conformist tendencies of the conventional social and economic order. Society erects barriers that the authentic person must break through. Finding your true self means self-reflection, engaging in candid self-appraisal and seeking ‘genuine self-knowledge’, in the words of the American philosopher Charles Guignon.

In his book The Society of Singularities (2017), the German social theorist Andreas Reckwitz argues that a larger ‘authenticity revolution’ has swept the world during the past 40 years. Authenticity has become an obligation. Reckwitz captures this conundrum with the paradoxical concept of ‘performative authenticity’. Authenticity, in this sense, is the way to be because to be ‘somebody’ is to develop your unique self, your differentness from others and your noninterchangeable life.

Performative authenticity is tied to economic success and social prestige, which means - and this is a further paradoxical feature - that your specialness and self-realisation have to be performed. In order for people to distinguish themselves, they must seek attention and visibility, and positively affect others with their self-representations, personal characteristics and quality of life. In doing so, they have to take great care that their performance isn’t perceived as staged.

Performative authenticity shares with older, inner conceptions of authenticity the notion that each of us has our own unique way of being in the world. But the concepts otherwise diverge. The inner ideal aims at a way of being that is unfeigned and without illusions. It resists the cultivation of an affirming audience, because being a ‘whole’ person, with a noninstrumental relation to self and others, is often at odds with the demands of society. In the performative mode, by contrast, this tension between self and society disappears. Self-elaboration still requires self-examination, but not necessarily of any inner or even aesthetic kind.

Performing your difference isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. Markets and digital technologies have greatly expanded the infrastructure of possibilities. It is, however, a competition for scarce attention that requires continuous assessment and feedback, and offers little respite. Even if you pull off a good performance, there’s a need to be flexible, to be ready to reinvent your difference. There’s always the danger of becoming inconspicuous.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Authenticity, which in its modern sense dates back to the Romantics of the late 18th century, has never had a single meaning. In much of our everyday usage, the term means something more or less analogous to the way that we speak of an object being authentic - as the genuine article, not a copy or a fake. We think of people as authentic when they’re being themselves, consistent with their own personality and without pretence or pretending.

But, as an ethical ideal...authenticity means more than self-consistency or a lack of pretentiousness. It also concerns features of the inner life that define us. While there is no one ‘essence’ of authenticity, the ideal has often been expressed as a commitment to being true to yourself, and ordering your soul and living your life so as to give faithful expression to your individuality, cherished projects and deepest convictions. Authenticity in this ethical sense also had a critical edge, standing against and challenging the utilitarian practices and conformist tendencies of the conventional social and economic order. Society erects barriers that the authentic person must break through. Finding your true self means self-reflection, engaging in candid self-appraisal and seeking ‘genuine self-knowledge’, in the words of the American philosopher Charles Guignon.

In his book The Society of Singularities (2017), the German social theorist Andreas Reckwitz argues that a larger ‘authenticity revolution’ has swept the world during the past 40 years. Authenticity has become an obligation. Reckwitz captures this conundrum with the paradoxical concept of ‘performative authenticity’. Authenticity, in this sense, is the way to be because to be ‘somebody’ is to develop your unique self, your differentness from others and your noninterchangeable life.

Performative authenticity is tied to economic success and social prestige, which means - and this is a further paradoxical feature - that your specialness and self-realisation have to be performed. In order for people to distinguish themselves, they must seek attention and visibility, and positively affect others with their self-representations, personal characteristics and quality of life. In doing so, they have to take great care that their performance isn’t perceived as staged.

Performative authenticity shares with older, inner conceptions of authenticity the notion that each of us has our own unique way of being in the world. But the concepts otherwise diverge. The inner ideal aims at a way of being that is unfeigned and without illusions. It resists the cultivation of an affirming audience, because being a ‘whole’ person, with a noninstrumental relation to self and others, is often at odds with the demands of society. In the performative mode, by contrast, this tension between self and society disappears. Self-elaboration still requires self-examination, but not necessarily of any inner or even aesthetic kind.

Performing your difference isn’t necessarily a zero-sum game. Markets and digital technologies have greatly expanded the infrastructure of possibilities. It is, however, a competition for scarce attention that requires continuous assessment and feedback, and offers little respite. Even if you pull off a good performance, there’s a need to be flexible, to be ready to reinvent your difference. There’s always the danger of becoming inconspicuous.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Charles Darwin thought the mental capacities of animals and people differed only in degree, not kind—a natural conclusion to reach when armed with the radical new belief that the one evolved from the other. His last great book, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals”, examined joy, love and grief in birds, domestic animals and primates as well as in various human races. But Darwin’s attitude to animals—easily shared by people in everyday contact with dogs, horses, even mice—ran contrary to a long tradition in European thought which held that animals had no minds at all. This way of thinking stemmed from the argument of René Descartes, a great 17th-century philosopher, that people were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines made of flesh—living robots which, in the words of Nicolas Malebranche, one of his followers, “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”

For much of the 20th century biology cleaved closer to Descartes than to Darwin. Students of animal behaviour did not rule out the possibility that animals had minds but thought the question almost irrelevant since it was impossible to answer. One could study an organism’s inputs (such as food or the environment) or outputs (its behaviour). But the organism itself remained a black box: unobservable things such as emotions or thoughts were beyond the scope of objective inquiry.

In the past 40 years, however, a wide range of work both in the field and the lab has pushed the consensus away from strict behaviourism and towards that Darwin-friendly view. Progress has not been easy or quick; as the behaviourists warned, both sorts of evidence can be misleading. Laboratory tests can be rigorous, but are inevitably based on animals which may not behave as they do in the wild. Field observations can be dismissed as anecdotal. Running them for years or decades and on a large scale goes some way to guarding against that problem, but such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, most scientists...say with confidence that some animals process information and express emotions in ways that are accompanied by conscious mental experience. They agree that animals...have complex mental capacities; that a few species have attributes once thought to be unique to people, such as the ability to give objects names and use tools; and that a handful of animals—primates, corvids (the crow family) and cetaceans (whales and dolphins)— have something close to what in humans is seen as culture, in that they develop distinctive ways of doing things which are passed down by imitation and example. Dolphins have been found to imitate the behaviour of other dolphins, in their group. No animals have all the attributes of human minds; but almost all the attributes of human minds are found in some animal or other.

Brain mapping reveals that the neurological processes underlying what look like emotions in rats are similar to those behind what clearly are emotions in humans. As a group of neuroscientists seeking to sum the field up put it in 2012, “Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures...also possess these neurological substrates.”

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Charles Darwin thought the mental capacities of animals and people differed only in degree, not kind—a natural conclusion to reach when armed with the radical new belief that the one evolved from the other. His last great book, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals”, examined joy, love and grief in birds, domestic animals and primates as well as in various human races. But Darwin’s attitude to animals—easily shared by people in everyday contact with dogs, horses, even mice—ran contrary to a long tradition in European thought which held that animals had no minds at all. This way of thinking stemmed from the argument of René Descartes, a great 17th-century philosopher, that people were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines made of flesh—living robots which, in the words of Nicolas Malebranche, one of his followers, “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”

For much of the 20th century biology cleaved closer to Descartes than to Darwin. Students of animal behaviour did not rule out the possibility that animals had minds but thought the question almost irrelevant since it was impossible to answer. One could study an organism’s inputs (such as food or the environment) or outputs (its behaviour). But the organism itself remained a black box: unobservable things such as emotions or thoughts were beyond the scope of objective inquiry.

In the past 40 years, however, a wide range of work both in the field and the lab has pushed the consensus away from strict behaviourism and towards that Darwin-friendly view. Progress has not been easy or quick; as the behaviourists warned, both sorts of evidence can be misleading. Laboratory tests can be rigorous, but are inevitably based on animals which may not behave as they do in the wild. Field observations can be dismissed as anecdotal. Running them for years or decades and on a large scale goes some way to guarding against that problem, but such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, most scientists...say with confidence that some animals process information and express emotions in ways that are accompanied by conscious mental experience. They agree that animals...have complex mental capacities; that a few species have attributes once thought to be unique to people, such as the ability to give objects names and use tools; and that a handful of animals—primates, corvids (the crow family) and cetaceans (whales and dolphins)— have something close to what in humans is seen as culture, in that they develop distinctive ways of doing things which are passed down by imitation and example. Dolphins have been found to imitate the behaviour of other dolphins, in their group. No animals have all the attributes of human minds; but almost all the attributes of human minds are found in some animal or other.

Brain mapping reveals that the neurological processes underlying what look like emotions in rats are similar to those behind what clearly are emotions in humans. As a group of neuroscientists seeking to sum the field up put it in 2012, “Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures...also possess these neurological substrates.”

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Charles Darwin thought the mental capacities of animals and people differed only in degree, not kind—a natural conclusion to reach when armed with the radical new belief that the one evolved from the other. His last great book, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals”, examined joy, love and grief in birds, domestic animals and primates as well as in various human races. But Darwin’s attitude to animals—easily shared by people in everyday contact with dogs, horses, even mice—ran contrary to a long tradition in European thought which held that animals had no minds at all. This way of thinking stemmed from the argument of René Descartes, a great 17th-century philosopher, that people were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines made of flesh—living robots which, in the words of Nicolas Malebranche, one of his followers, “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”

For much of the 20th century biology cleaved closer to Descartes than to Darwin. Students of animal behaviour did not rule out the possibility that animals had minds but thought the question almost irrelevant since it was impossible to answer. One could study an organism’s inputs (such as food or the environment) or outputs (its behaviour). But the organism itself remained a black box: unobservable things such as emotions or thoughts were beyond the scope of objective inquiry.

In the past 40 years, however, a wide range of work both in the field and the lab has pushed the consensus away from strict behaviourism and towards that Darwin-friendly view. Progress has not been easy or quick; as the behaviourists warned, both sorts of evidence can be misleading. Laboratory tests can be rigorous, but are inevitably based on animals which may not behave as they do in the wild. Field observations can be dismissed as anecdotal. Running them for years or decades and on a large scale goes some way to guarding against that problem, but such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, most scientists...say with confidence that some animals process information and express emotions in ways that are accompanied by conscious mental experience. They agree that animals...have complex mental capacities; that a few species have attributes once thought to be unique to people, such as the ability to give objects names and use tools; and that a handful of animals—primates, corvids (the crow family) and cetaceans (whales and dolphins)— have something close to what in humans is seen as culture, in that they develop distinctive ways of doing things which are passed down by imitation and example. Dolphins have been found to imitate the behaviour of other dolphins, in their group. No animals have all the attributes of human minds; but almost all the attributes of human minds are found in some animal or other.

Brain mapping reveals that the neurological processes underlying what look like emotions in rats are similar to those behind what clearly are emotions in humans. As a group of neuroscientists seeking to sum the field up put it in 2012, “Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures...also possess these neurological substrates.”

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Charles Darwin thought the mental capacities of animals and people differed only in degree, not kind—a natural conclusion to reach when armed with the radical new belief that the one evolved from the other. His last great book, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals”, examined joy, love and grief in birds, domestic animals and primates as well as in various human races. But Darwin’s attitude to animals—easily shared by people in everyday contact with dogs, horses, even mice—ran contrary to a long tradition in European thought which held that animals had no minds at all. This way of thinking stemmed from the argument of René Descartes, a great 17th-century philosopher, that people were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines made of flesh—living robots which, in the words of Nicolas Malebranche, one of his followers, “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”

For much of the 20th century biology cleaved closer to Descartes than to Darwin. Students of animal behaviour did not rule out the possibility that animals had minds but thought the question almost irrelevant since it was impossible to answer. One could study an organism’s inputs (such as food or the environment) or outputs (its behaviour). But the organism itself remained a black box: unobservable things such as emotions or thoughts were beyond the scope of objective inquiry.

In the past 40 years, however, a wide range of work both in the field and the lab has pushed the consensus away from strict behaviourism and towards that Darwin-friendly view. Progress has not been easy or quick; as the behaviourists warned, both sorts of evidence can be misleading. Laboratory tests can be rigorous, but are inevitably based on animals which may not behave as they do in the wild. Field observations can be dismissed as anecdotal. Running them for years or decades and on a large scale goes some way to guarding against that problem, but such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, most scientists...say with confidence that some animals process information and express emotions in ways that are accompanied by conscious mental experience. They agree that animals...have complex mental capacities; that a few species have attributes once thought to be unique to people, such as the ability to give objects names and use tools; and that a handful of animals—primates, corvids (the crow family) and cetaceans (whales and dolphins)— have something close to what in humans is seen as culture, in that they develop distinctive ways of doing things which are passed down by imitation and example. Dolphins have been found to imitate the behaviour of other dolphins, in their group. No animals have all the attributes of human minds; but almost all the attributes of human minds are found in some animal or other.

Brain mapping reveals that the neurological processes underlying what look like emotions in rats are similar to those behind what clearly are emotions in humans. As a group of neuroscientists seeking to sum the field up put it in 2012, “Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures...also possess these neurological substrates.”

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Charles Darwin thought the mental capacities of animals and people differed only in degree, not kind—a natural conclusion to reach when armed with the radical new belief that the one evolved from the other. His last great book, “The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals”, examined joy, love and grief in birds, domestic animals and primates as well as in various human races. But Darwin’s attitude to animals—easily shared by people in everyday contact with dogs, horses, even mice—ran contrary to a long tradition in European thought which held that animals had no minds at all. This way of thinking stemmed from the argument of René Descartes, a great 17th-century philosopher, that people were creatures of reason, linked to the mind of God, while animals were merely machines made of flesh—living robots which, in the words of Nicolas Malebranche, one of his followers, “eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it: they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing.”

For much of the 20th century biology cleaved closer to Descartes than to Darwin. Students of animal behaviour did not rule out the possibility that animals had minds but thought the question almost irrelevant since it was impossible to answer. One could study an organism’s inputs (such as food or the environment) or outputs (its behaviour). But the organism itself remained a black box: unobservable things such as emotions or thoughts were beyond the scope of objective inquiry.

In the past 40 years, however, a wide range of work both in the field and the lab has pushed the consensus away from strict behaviourism and towards that Darwin-friendly view. Progress has not been easy or quick; as the behaviourists warned, both sorts of evidence can be misleading. Laboratory tests can be rigorous, but are inevitably based on animals which may not behave as they do in the wild. Field observations can be dismissed as anecdotal. Running them for years or decades and on a large scale goes some way to guarding against that problem, but such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, most scientists...say with confidence that some animals process information and express emotions in ways that are accompanied by conscious mental experience. They agree that animals...have complex mental capacities; that a few species have attributes once thought to be unique to people, such as the ability to give objects names and use tools; and that a handful of animals—primates, corvids (the crow family) and cetaceans (whales and dolphins)— have something close to what in humans is seen as culture, in that they develop distinctive ways of doing things which are passed down by imitation and example. Dolphins have been found to imitate the behaviour of other dolphins, in their group. No animals have all the attributes of human minds; but almost all the attributes of human minds are found in some animal or other.

Brain mapping reveals that the neurological processes underlying what look like emotions in rats are similar to those behind what clearly are emotions in humans. As a group of neuroscientists seeking to sum the field up put it in 2012, “Humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures...also possess these neurological substrates.”

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Fantasy politics starts from the expectation that wishes should come true, that the best outcome imaginable is not just possible but overwhelmingly likely. The great appeal of fantasy politics is that it puts you in complete control. Using the power of your imagination, you get to control not only what you will do but also how everyone else will react. Everyone recognises your awesomeness and competes to serve your interests, whether motivated by admiration or fear.

Why is fantasy politics so popular these days? One reason is that it is so much easier than real politics. In real politics, we try to address multiple, intersecting, complicated collective action problems - like the high cost of housing or sexism in the labour market - while at the same time grappling with the deep diversity of beliefs, values, and interests within and between societies. Real politics is a difficult and time-consuming activity that usually requires dissatisfactory compromise with reality and what other people want. It is much easier to make-believe our way to our favoured outcomes.

Fantasy politics is also much more inherently satisfying than real politics. It gives us the opportunity to express our political values and loyalties and this is something that feels good in itself and has an immediate psychic payoff, regardless of whether anything we are doing is actually contributing to bringing about the outcome we claim to want. Raising the stakes in our imagination, for example by elevating a mundane legislative election to a decisive battle between good and evil, immediately makes us feel more vital and significant. Conspiracy theorising similarly raises the stakes, casting us in the role of a band of heroes, such as QAnon followers, fighting to bring to light and bring down depraved evil. All this contrasts with the meagre psychic rewards of participating in real politics, as merely one voice among millions of equals no more special than anyone else.

The psychic benefits of fantasy politics seem especially attractive to those who feel neglected and unheard by the political system, such as the white working class in towns left behind by the modern economy. For these losers, animated by grievance, fantasy politics offers their only way to feel politically significant. Moreover, like the victim’s dreams of revenge against their bully, these resentment driven fantasies are not kind. In the mid-term, the failure of populist fantasies like Brexit (a classic example of fantasy politics) will no doubt reinforce their followers' cynicism and alienation.

It should also be mentioned that fantasy politics is everywhere these days because fantasy itself is so popular. The kookiness of America’s gun rights movement, for example, has a lot to do with its animating hero fantasy of the regular guy standing up against the bad guys or evil government. In these movie screenplays that they write themselves, the good guy never misses and the bad guys never manage to shoot straight; and when the police arrive they can immediately tell who the good guys are.

Finally, demand creates its own supply. Political entrepreneurs like Trump or Farage or Boris come out of the woodwork and start pitching more fantasy products for voters to buy- so long as large numbers of our fellow citizens are disinterested in outcomes and prefer wallowing in fantasy, populist politicians will make hay.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Fantasy politics starts from the expectation that wishes should come true, that the best outcome imaginable is not just possible but overwhelmingly likely. The great appeal of fantasy politics is that it puts you in complete control. Using the power of your imagination, you get to control not only what you will do but also how everyone else will react. Everyone recognises your awesomeness and competes to serve your interests, whether motivated by admiration or fear.

Why is fantasy politics so popular these days? One reason is that it is so much easier than real politics. In real politics, we try to address multiple, intersecting, complicated collective action problems - like the high cost of housing or sexism in the labour market - while at the same time grappling with the deep diversity of beliefs, values, and interests within and between societies. Real politics is a difficult and time-consuming activity that usually requires dissatisfactory compromise with reality and what other people want. It is much easier to make-believe our way to our favoured outcomes.

Fantasy politics is also much more inherently satisfying than real politics. It gives us the opportunity to express our political values and loyalties and this is something that feels good in itself and has an immediate psychic payoff, regardless of whether anything we are doing is actually contributing to bringing about the outcome we claim to want. Raising the stakes in our imagination, for example by elevating a mundane legislative election to a decisive battle between good and evil, immediately makes us feel more vital and significant. Conspiracy theorising similarly raises the stakes, casting us in the role of a band of heroes, such as QAnon followers, fighting to bring to light and bring down depraved evil. All this contrasts with the meagre psychic rewards of participating in real politics, as merely one voice among millions of equals no more special than anyone else.

The psychic benefits of fantasy politics seem especially attractive to those who feel neglected and unheard by the political system, such as the white working class in towns left behind by the modern economy. For these losers, animated by grievance, fantasy politics offers their only way to feel politically significant. Moreover, like the victim’s dreams of revenge against their bully, these resentment driven fantasies are not kind. In the mid-term, the failure of populist fantasies like Brexit (a classic example of fantasy politics) will no doubt reinforce their followers' cynicism and alienation.

It should also be mentioned that fantasy politics is everywhere these days because fantasy itself is so popular. The kookiness of America’s gun rights movement, for example, has a lot to do with its animating hero fantasy of the regular guy standing up against the bad guys or evil government. In these movie screenplays that they write themselves, the good guy never misses and the bad guys never manage to shoot straight; and when the police arrive they can immediately tell who the good guys are.

Finally, demand creates its own supply. Political entrepreneurs like Trump or Farage or Boris come out of the woodwork and start pitching more fantasy products for voters to buy- so long as large numbers of our fellow citizens are disinterested in outcomes and prefer wallowing in fantasy, populist politicians will make hay.

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Fantasy politics starts from the expectation that wishes should come true, that the best outcome imaginable is not just possible but overwhelmingly likely. The great appeal of fantasy politics is that it puts you in complete control. Using the power of your imagination, you get to control not only what you will do but also how everyone else will react. Everyone recognises your awesomeness and competes to serve your interests, whether motivated by admiration or fear.

Why is fantasy politics so popular these days? One reason is that it is so much easier than real politics. In real politics, we try to address multiple, intersecting, complicated collective action problems - like the high cost of housing or sexism in the labour market - while at the same time grappling with the deep diversity of beliefs, values, and interests within and between societies. Real politics is a difficult and time-consuming activity that usually requires dissatisfactory compromise with reality and what other people want. It is much easier to make-believe our way to our favoured outcomes.

Fantasy politics is also much more inherently satisfying than real politics. It gives us the opportunity to express our political values and loyalties and this is something that feels good in itself and has an immediate psychic payoff, regardless of whether anything we are doing is actually contributing to bringing about the outcome we claim to want. Raising the stakes in our imagination, for example by elevating a mundane legislative election to a decisive battle between good and evil, immediately makes us feel more vital and significant. Conspiracy theorising similarly raises the stakes, casting us in the role of a band of heroes, such as QAnon followers, fighting to bring to light and bring down depraved evil. All this contrasts with the meagre psychic rewards of participating in real politics, as merely one voice among millions of equals no more special than anyone else.

The psychic benefits of fantasy politics seem especially attractive to those who feel neglected and unheard by the political system, such as the white working class in towns left behind by the modern economy. For these losers, animated by grievance, fantasy politics offers their only way to feel politically significant. Moreover, like the victim’s dreams of revenge against their bully, these resentment driven fantasies are not kind. In the mid-term, the failure of populist fantasies like Brexit (a classic example of fantasy politics) will no doubt reinforce their followers' cynicism and alienation.

It should also be mentioned that fantasy politics is everywhere these days because fantasy itself is so popular. The kookiness of America’s gun rights movement, for example, has a lot to do with its animating hero fantasy of the regular guy standing up against the bad guys or evil government. In these movie screenplays that they write themselves, the good guy never misses and the bad guys never manage to shoot straight; and when the police arrive they can immediately tell who the good guys are.

Finally, demand creates its own supply. Political entrepreneurs like Trump or Farage or Boris come out of the woodwork and start pitching more fantasy products for voters to buy- so long as large numbers of our fellow citizens are disinterested in outcomes and prefer wallowing in fantasy, populist politicians will make hay.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Fantasy politics starts from the expectation that wishes should come true, that the best outcome imaginable is not just possible but overwhelmingly likely. The great appeal of fantasy politics is that it puts you in complete control. Using the power of your imagination, you get to control not only what you will do but also how everyone else will react. Everyone recognises your awesomeness and competes to serve your interests, whether motivated by admiration or fear.

Why is fantasy politics so popular these days? One reason is that it is so much easier than real politics. In real politics, we try to address multiple, intersecting, complicated collective action problems - like the high cost of housing or sexism in the labour market - while at the same time grappling with the deep diversity of beliefs, values, and interests within and between societies. Real politics is a difficult and time-consuming activity that usually requires dissatisfactory compromise with reality and what other people want. It is much easier to make-believe our way to our favoured outcomes.

Fantasy politics is also much more inherently satisfying than real politics. It gives us the opportunity to express our political values and loyalties and this is something that feels good in itself and has an immediate psychic payoff, regardless of whether anything we are doing is actually contributing to bringing about the outcome we claim to want. Raising the stakes in our imagination, for example by elevating a mundane legislative election to a decisive battle between good and evil, immediately makes us feel more vital and significant. Conspiracy theorising similarly raises the stakes, casting us in the role of a band of heroes, such as QAnon followers, fighting to bring to light and bring down depraved evil. All this contrasts with the meagre psychic rewards of participating in real politics, as merely one voice among millions of equals no more special than anyone else.

The psychic benefits of fantasy politics seem especially attractive to those who feel neglected and unheard by the political system, such as the white working class in towns left behind by the modern economy. For these losers, animated by grievance, fantasy politics offers their only way to feel politically significant. Moreover, like the victim’s dreams of revenge against their bully, these resentment driven fantasies are not kind. In the mid-term, the failure of populist fantasies like Brexit (a classic example of fantasy politics) will no doubt reinforce their followers' cynicism and alienation.

It should also be mentioned that fantasy politics is everywhere these days because fantasy itself is so popular. The kookiness of America’s gun rights movement, for example, has a lot to do with its animating hero fantasy of the regular guy standing up against the bad guys or evil government. In these movie screenplays that they write themselves, the good guy never misses and the bad guys never manage to shoot straight; and when the police arrive they can immediately tell who the good guys are.

Finally, demand creates its own supply. Political entrepreneurs like Trump or Farage or Boris come out of the woodwork and start pitching more fantasy products for voters to buy- so long as large numbers of our fellow citizens are disinterested in outcomes and prefer wallowing in fantasy, populist politicians will make hay.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

Read the passage carefully and answer the following questions:

Fantasy politics starts from the expectation that wishes should come true, that the best outcome imaginable is not just possible but overwhelmingly likely. The great appeal of fantasy politics is that it puts you in complete control. Using the power of your imagination, you get to control not only what you will do but also how everyone else will react. Everyone recognises your awesomeness and competes to serve your interests, whether motivated by admiration or fear.

Why is fantasy politics so popular these days? One reason is that it is so much easier than real politics. In real politics, we try to address multiple, intersecting, complicated collective action problems - like the high cost of housing or sexism in the labour market - while at the same time grappling with the deep diversity of beliefs, values, and interests within and between societies. Real politics is a difficult and time-consuming activity that usually requires dissatisfactory compromise with reality and what other people want. It is much easier to make-believe our way to our favoured outcomes.

Fantasy politics is also much more inherently satisfying than real politics. It gives us the opportunity to express our political values and loyalties and this is something that feels good in itself and has an immediate psychic payoff, regardless of whether anything we are doing is actually contributing to bringing about the outcome we claim to want. Raising the stakes in our imagination, for example by elevating a mundane legislative election to a decisive battle between good and evil, immediately makes us feel more vital and significant. Conspiracy theorising similarly raises the stakes, casting us in the role of a band of heroes, such as QAnon followers, fighting to bring to light and bring down depraved evil. All this contrasts with the meagre psychic rewards of participating in real politics, as merely one voice among millions of equals no more special than anyone else.

The psychic benefits of fantasy politics seem especially attractive to those who feel neglected and unheard by the political system, such as the white working class in towns left behind by the modern economy. For these losers, animated by grievance, fantasy politics offers their only way to feel politically significant. Moreover, like the victim’s dreams of revenge against their bully, these resentment driven fantasies are not kind. In the mid-term, the failure of populist fantasies like Brexit (a classic example of fantasy politics) will no doubt reinforce their followers' cynicism and alienation.

It should also be mentioned that fantasy politics is everywhere these days because fantasy itself is so popular. The kookiness of America’s gun rights movement, for example, has a lot to do with its animating hero fantasy of the regular guy standing up against the bad guys or evil government. In these movie screenplays that they write themselves, the good guy never misses and the bad guys never manage to shoot straight; and when the police arrive they can immediately tell who the good guys are.

Finally, demand creates its own supply. Political entrepreneurs like Trump or Farage or Boris come out of the woodwork and start pitching more fantasy products for voters to buy- so long as large numbers of our fellow citizens are disinterested in outcomes and prefer wallowing in fantasy, populist politicians will make hay.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek ' anarkhia ', meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.

Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.

The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.

For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.

The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist- communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchist-communism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .

There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806-56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek ' anarkhia ', meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.

Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.

The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.

For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.

The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist- communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchist-communism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .

There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806-56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek ' anarkhia ', meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.

Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.

The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.

For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.

The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist- communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchist-communism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .

There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806-56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek ' anarkhia ', meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.

Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.

The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.

For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.

The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist- communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchist-communism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .

There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806-56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek ' anarkhia ', meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.

Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.

The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.

For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.

The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist- communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchist-communism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .

There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806-56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.

correct answer:- 2

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correct answer:- 4321

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correct answer:- 1

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correct answer:- 2

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correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .

For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .

Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .

So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .

For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .

Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .

So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .

For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .

Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .

So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .

For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .

Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .

So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 2

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 3

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps — the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.

Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."

Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.

Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.

So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top, he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature’s materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.

Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.

It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn’t until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It’s eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.

We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne’s lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in an “unnatural” way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.

Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains ofHolsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.

The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of “mechanical” and “life” are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1)Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.

correct answer:- 4

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature’s materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.

Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.

It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn’t until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It’s eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.

We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne’s lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in an “unnatural” way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.

Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains ofHolsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.

The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of “mechanical” and “life” are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1)Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.

correct answer:- 4

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Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature’s materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.

Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.

It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn’t until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It’s eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.

We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne’s lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in an “unnatural” way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.

Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains ofHolsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.

The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of “mechanical” and “life” are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1)Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature’s materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.

Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.

It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn’t until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It’s eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.

We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne’s lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in an “unnatural” way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.

Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains ofHolsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.

The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of “mechanical” and “life” are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1)Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.

correct answer:- 2

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Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.

Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella, this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.

Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.

correct answer:- 3

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Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.

Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella, this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.

Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.

Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella, this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.

Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.

correct answer:- 1

---

Instruction for set :

The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.

Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella, this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.

Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.

correct answer:- 1

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correct answer:- 2413

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correct answer:- 1

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correct answer:- 2

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correct answer:- 1