MAT 2007

Read the passages to answer the questions that follow each passage.

PASSAGE - I
“Since wars begin in the minds of men,” So runs the historic UNESCO Preamble, “It is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” Wars erupt out when the minds of men are inflamed, when the human mind is blinded and wounded, succumbs to frustration and selfnegation. War is the transference of this self-negation into the other-negation. The three Indo-Pak wars and the persisting will to terrorise have emanated from this savage instinct of other-negation that is the legacy of the partition carnage and its still-bleeding and unhealed wound. Truncated from its eastern wing in 1971, Pakistan ever since has suffered from a sense of total existential self-negation. Plus the scars left the two previously lost wars to India and Kargil fill the Army and the Pakistan psyche with a seething urge to revenge :that India has to be negated, destroyed - in a deep psychological sense, another Hiroshima in the subcontinent is imaginable and possible. Terrorism in Kashmir springs from such deep negating existential grounds. Like the former Soviet Union, Pakistan came into being as a result of a grand delusion and massive perversion of reality - the so called two-nation theory. Like the former Soviet Union, it stands in danger of crumbling unless it modifies its reality perception and comes to terms with its post-Bangladesh identity within the prevailing subcontinental equation. Failing this, Pakistan is bound to break up, nudging the region to a nuclear nightmare, including possible South Asian Hiroshimas. With ‘hot pursuits’ and ‘surgical operations’ freely making rounds among the policy elite and the public at large, the national atmosphere looks ominously charged. “On the brink,” headlines The week adding, “As men and machines are quickly positioned by India and Pakistan, the threat of war looms real”. To which Gen. Musharraf counters, “If any war is thrust on Pakistan, Pakistan’s armed forces and the 140 million people of Pakistan are fully prepared to face all consequences with all their might.” According to Indian Express, “Pakistan has deployed medium range ballistic missile batteries (MRBBs) along the line of Control (LOC) near Jammu and Poonch sectors in an action that will further escalate the tension between the two countries.” And India’s Defence Minister ups the ante, “We could take a (nuclear) strike, survive and then hit back, Pakistan would be finished.” (Hindustan Times, December 30, 2001) Mr. Fernandes’s formulation is certainly a tactical super shot, even a strategical super hit in as much as this is the very logic of India’s ‘Nofirst-strike’ doctrine. The Defence Minister obviously has no idea of the ethical, phenomenological implications of abandoning chunks of the Indian population to ransom for potential Hiroshimas and then ‘finishing’ the neighbouring country of 140 million in what could be nothing short of an Armageddon. Forget these horrendous scenarios. But does this not repudiate the grain of truth for which India’s civilisation stood for and vindicated across the untold millennia of its history? Yet, Mr. Fernandes, the pacifist and Gandhian, is no warmonger. As Defence Minister he had to react at a level with the Pakistanis, with their proclivity to drop the nuclear speak when ever that suited them, could have registered the message.

Read the passages to answer the questions that follow each passage.

PASSAGE - II
Not even a three-day brainstorming session among top psychologists at the Chinese University could unravel one of the world’s greatest puzzles - how the Chinese mind ticks. Michael Bond had reason to pace the pavement of the Chinese University campus last week. The psychologist who coordinated and moderated a three-day seminar in Chinese psychology and most of the participants came a long way to knock heads. “If a bomb hits this building” muttered Bond, half-seriously, “It would wipe out the whole discipline.” But the only thing that went off in the Cho Yiu Conference Hall of Chinese University was the picking of brains, the pouring out of brains and a refrain from an on-going mantra: “more work needs to be done” or “we don’t know”. Each of the 36 participants was allowed 30 minutes plus use of an overhead projector to condense years of research into data and theories. Their content spilled over from 20 areas of Chinese behaviour, including reading, learning styles, psychopathology, social interaction, personality and modernisation. An over-riding question for observers, however, was why, in this group of 21 Chinese and 15 nonChinese, weren’t there more professionals from mainland China presenting research on the indigenous people ? Michael Philips, a psychiatrist who works in Hubei province, explained: “The Cultural Revolution silenced and froze the research,” said the Canadian-born doctor who has lived and worked in China for more than 10 years. “And 12 years later, research is under way but it is too early to have anything yet. Besides, most of the models being used are from the West anyway.” In such a specialised field, how can nonChinese academics do research without possessing fluency in Chinese ? Those who cannot read, write or speak the language usually team up with Chinese colleagues “ In 10 years, we won’t be able to do this. It’s a money thing,” said William Gabrenya of Florida Institute of Technology, who described himself as an illiterate Gweilo who lacks fluency in Chinese. He said that 93 per cent of the non-Chinese authors in his field cannot read Chinese. Dr. Gabrenya raised questions such as why is research dependent on university students, why is research done on Chinese people in coastal cities (Singapore, Taiwan, Shanghai and Hong Kong) but not inland? “Chinese psychology is too Confucian, too neat. He’s been dead a long time. How about the guy on motorcycle in Taipei?” Dr. Gabrenya said, urging that research have a more contemporary outlook. 

         The academics came from Israel, Sweden, Taiwan, Singapore, United states, British Columbia and, of course, Hong kong. Many of the visual aids they used by way of illustration contained eye-squinting type and cobweb-like graphs. One speaker, a sociologist from Illinois, even warned her colleagues that she would not give anyone enough time to digest the long, skinny columns of numbers. Is Chinese intelligence different from Western? For half of the audience who are illiterate in Chinese, Professor Jimmy Chan of HKU examined each of the Chinese characters for “intelligence”. Phrases such as “a mind as fast as an arrow” and connections between strokes for sun and the moon were made. After his 25-minute speech, Chan and the group lamented that using Western tests are the only measure available to psychologists, who are starving for indigenous studies of Chinese by Chinese. How do Chinese children learn ? David Kember of Hong Kong Polytechnic University zeroed in on deep learning versus surface. Deep is when the student is sincerely interested for his own reasons. Surface is memorising and spitting out facts. It doesn't nurture any deep understanding. If the language of instruction happens to be the children's second language, students in Hong Kong have all sorts of challenges with English-speaking teachers from Australia, Britain and America with accents and colloquialisms. Do Westerners have more self-esteem than Chinese? Dr. Leung Kwok, chairman of the psychology department of Chinese University, points his finger at belief systems: the collectivist mind-set often stereotypes Chinese unfairly. The philosophy of "yuen" (a concept used to explain good and bad events which are predetermined and out of the individual's control) does not foster a positive selfconcept. Neither do collectivist beliefs, such as sacrifice for the group, compromise and importance of using connections. "If a Chinese loses or fails, he has a stronger sense of responsibility. He tends to blame it on himself. A non-Chinese from the West may blame it on forces outside himself," Dr. Leung said. By the end of the three-day session, there were as many questions raised as answered. It was agreed there was room for further research. To the layman, so much of the discussion was foreign and riddled with jargon and on-going references to studies and researchers. The work of the participants will resurface in a forthcoming Handbook of Chinese Psychology, which will be edited by Dr. Bond and published by Oxford University Press.

Read the passages to answer the questions that follow each passage.

PASSAGE -III
After President George W. Bush signed the United States - India Nuclear Cooperation Bill, he called up Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to tell him how pleased he was at this development. While welcoming this event, the Prime Minister took the opportunity to tell the President that there remained areas of concern that needed to be addressed during the negotiation of the bilateral agreement (called the 123 agreement, after the relevant clause number in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, 1954). The U.S. has entered into some twenty five I 23 agreements with various countries, including the one concerning Tarapur. The Tarapur agreement concluded in 1963 was unique in that it guaranteed supplies of enriched uranium fuel from the U.S. for running the Tarapur reactors for their entire life. However, after 1978 the U.S. did not supply fuel saying its domestic legislation (under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act) prevented it from doing so. India argued that Tarapur was an inter-governmental agreement and hence it had to be honoured by the U.S. But to no avail. However, later, the U.S. allowed France to supply fuel to India. Subsequently, the USSR (now Russia) and even China supplied fuel for Tarapur. The lesson from the Tarapur episode is that U.S. breached with impunity even a cast-iron guarantee it had furnished. Considerable bitterness gres between the U.S. and India are extended to many other areas beyond the nuclear one. When India agreed, reluctantly, in March 2006 to put imported reactors under “safeguards in perpetuity”, the U.S. consented to the Indian insistence on assurances of fuel supply. This meant India could build up a stockpile of fuel to tide over disruption in supply and the U.S. would agree to work with other countries namely Russia, France, and Britain to arrange alternate supplies. The U.S. legislation, based on the Hyde Bill, forbids India building up a stockpile of nuclear fuel. It also obligates the U.S. administration to work with other Nuclear Supplier Group countries to get them to suspend supplies to India, if the U.S. has done so under some provision of the Hyde Bill. It is not evident how the U.S. can address the legitimate concerns of India on continued fuel supply, given the boundaries set by the Hyde Bill. With regard to future nuclear tests, the Prime Minister has said, India is only committed to a voluntary moratorium. The moratorium is only a temporary holding off of an activity, conditioned by specific circumstances that obtained at the time when such a declaration was made. It cannot be construed as a permanent ban. The Hyde Bill has sought to make the moratorium into a permanent ban. However, there is no such restraint imposed on the U.S., China, Pakistan or any other country. In bringing up this issue, I do not wish to suggest that I favour a resumption of tests by India. But India cannot prevent other countries from carrying out tests. It is, therefore, unacceptable that India forfeits its right to test for all time to come under the agreement with the U.S. Even if the 123agreement is silent on the issue, Indian negotiators must put this issue on the table. The Hyde Bill calls for suspension of all cooperation and fuel supplies and even calls for return of all equipment and materials supplied earlier in the event of a test. It baffles one how India can return reactor installations that might have been operated a few years, were such a contingency to arise in future. The differences over the definition of “full civilian nuclear cooperation” have been discussed in the media. The Indian understanding was that reprocessing of spent fuel, enrichment of uranium, and production of heavy water also formed part of the term “full civilian nuclear cooperation.” In the congressional debate, it has been noted that these were construed by the U.S. to be in the nature of military activities and not civilian. India’s future plans for thorium utilisation for civil nuclear power depend crucially on reprocessing. Similarly, civil nuclear power units using natural uranium require heavy water as reactor coolant and moderator. Equally if India were to embark on a sizeable light water reactor programme, it may like to have control on supply of enriched uranium for economic and supply security reasons. India has technologies of its own in these areas and will develop them further in the years ahead. If the Indo-U.S. agreement moves ahead in the manner its sponsors have speculated, in a few decades from now some 90 per cent of the nuclear installations in India would be open to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. In that scenario, how can India reconcile to the embargo from nuclear advanced countries on the export of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technologies? Even if the issue were to be papered over new, it will then look from India’s point of view to have been a very bad bargain.