Read the following passages carefully and answer the questions given at the end of each passage

Because of the critical role played by steel in economic development, the steel industry is often considered, especially by the governments, which traditionally owned it, to be an indicator of economic prowess. World production has grown exponentially, but there were big highs and equally big lows all through the 1990s and up to 2002. Recovery from the two World Wars and the Great Depression of the 1930s caused massive disruption and lay-offs. Over-capacity and low steel prices continued to play havoc through the 1970s and 1980s and politicians began to lose their belief that the wealth of a nation was directly coupled to its steel production.

 This led to a wave of privatisations, as state-owned enterprises shed their financial liabilities to hungry capitalists. A whole new breed of steel-makers came into being using a new technology, the mini-mill. This used a smaller electric-arc furnace fed that just melts down ‘cold’ scrap. It was a cheaper process than the traditional ‘hot metal integrated mills’ with their mountains of ore and coal and monumental machinery, but it was used almost exclusively for lower-grade building and other ‘long’ products.

 By the beginning of 2005, the world steel industry was on a high, after decades of moving from apocalypse to break-even and then back to apocalypse. Since 2003, when a staggering 960 million tonnes were produced-compared to 21.9 million tonnes for aluminium-there had been unprecedented demand, mainly from China and India. China was both the biggest producer, the first country to exceed 200 million tonnes of crude steel in a year, and also its biggest consumer at 244 million tonnes. The global economy was also booming, but this was creating production bottlenecks for all steel-makers and by 2004 steel had for the first time hit an average of $650 per tonne shipped. Profit margins were better, but where was the growth to come from? In tandem, the costs of essential raw materials for steel-making - iron ore coking coal-had gone through the roof, along with bulk shipping costs. The key to future growth was to secure plants in emerging markets where ore and coal were close to production sites, labour costs were much lower and where technology and investment could spur greater savings.

But the central issue was that globally the industry remained a very fragmented one. No single company was producing 100 million tonnes a year, or 10 per cent of total world production. The name of the game was consolidation into fewer, bigger players. With this would come the chance for steel-makers to gain greater pricing power, increasing their profitability and the value of their shares. 

Two groups had begun to move ahead of the pack. One was Mittal Steel with its operational headquarters in London’s prestigious Berkeley Square. Mittal Steel was the world’s biggest producer of ‘long’ products. It was young, aggressive, fast, and a big risk-taker, fuelled by its founder Lakshmi Mittal’s visionary zeal to consolidate the industry. Its nearest rival, Arcelor - the world’s most profitable steel company, focusing on ‘flat’ products - was headed by the Frenchman Guy Dolle, and was a combination of three former state-owned European steel plants: Arbed of Luxembourg, Usinor from France and Spain’s Aceralia. These three were now merged, restructured and administered from the grandiose, chateau-like former Arbed headquarters in Luxembourg’s Avenue de la Liberte.

Both groups were passionate about steel. Mittal, already dubbed ‘the Carnegie from Calcutta’, had a clearer vision of the need to streamline steel, but Arcelor was determined to become the biggest as well as the best. Dominating the market would enable either firm to increase its pricing position with customers, the car-makers, ship-builders and construction firms, as well as chasing growth in the new markets of Asia, South America and Eastern Europe. 

Guy Dolle could hear the clump of Mittal’s feet marching ahead, and it hurt. Arcelor was Europe’s reigning steel champion and was arrogantly proud of it. It had a commanding market share of the specialised high-strength steel supplied to European car-makers, and a total overall production approaching 50 million tonnes a year, all with state-of-the-art technology. The group had repaired its consolidated balance sheet, ravished by decades of downturns and continual restructuring costs. It had invested heavily in the quest for best technology and had also acquired companies in Brazil, set up joint ventures in Russia, Japan and China and now was eagerly eyeing gateways to the North American car market. And to its long-suffering shareholders, starved of decent dividends, Arcelor was at last moving in the right direction, after the blood, sweat and tears of shifting from public to private sector. The Luxembourg group was clearly on a wake-up call, gunning to overtake Mittal Steel and keep it at bay.

By 2005, the battle for supremacy had begun to heat up. Two projected state sell-offs by public auction, in Turkey and Ukraine, were particularly attractive commercially. Both auctions were taking place in October, within three weeks of each other. The first, in Turkey, was for the 46.3 percent of government-owned shares in Erdemir, a steel-maker producing 3.5 million tonnes a year for car-makers and other industrial clients in a country of seventy million people shaping up to join the European Union. Mittal and Arcelor both already owned minitory stakes in the Turkish company and were eager to get majority control.